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Executive summary and policy recommendations  
There is no doubt that a new approach is needed to combating money laundering. For the past three 
decades policymakers have struggled to implement effective anti-money laundering (AML) policies. 
While the scope of action has expanded greatly, the success of AML policies has been very limited. 
Launderers and criminals, aided by technology, have become ever more inventive, which has 
necessitated continual adaptation of the regulatory framework.  
Given the ongoing monitoring and law enforcement challenges, the EU Commission and some member 
states have come out in favour of the creation of an EU-wide AML supervisory agency. This body might 
assist in reducing some of the coordination and cooperation issues in AML enforcement, particularly 
those that cross borders. However, rather than the supervisory dimension, the regulatory side needs to 
be addressed first. Here, a radically new approach is needed, based on the EU’s principles of 
proportionality. A thorough benefit/cost analysis of the AML rules thus far could guide the way to a 
more measured and effective approach. Every day, banks and other ‘obliged entities’ complete 
thousands of suspicious transactions reports, of which only a handful are followed up on by financial 
intelligence units (FIUs), whether owing to lack of capability, capacity or even political direction. 
It is an illusion to believe that a single, Europe-wide supervisory agency could, in the current 
circumstances, be the sole solution. AML supervision requires the cooperation of a multitude of 
supervisory entities, financial and non-financial supervisors, FIUs and law enforcement officials, as well 
as the obliged entities themselves. In the EU context, this means well in excess of 100 supervisory 
agencies, and many tens of thousands of obliged entities. It raises the issue of EU competence, certainly 
in the law enforcement and judicial domains. But it is beyond debate that improvement is needed. We 
would argue in favour of a step-by-step approach, building upon the framework already put in place by 
the European Banking Authority (EBA), and expanding this gradually (first by means of increasing the 
effectiveness of data exchange), with a distinct and more effective governance structure. 
Before acting at the EU level, member states should put their own houses in order. On the financial 
supervisory side alone, 57 different entities sit around the table at the EBA in its newly created Standing 
Committee, which demonstrates the diversity at the national level. On the non-financial side, the 
structure is even more complex, and clearly much less integrated at the EU or international levels.  
A real bottleneck in AML effectiveness lies with the FIUs, which are designated to process both cash 
transaction reports (CTRs) and suspicious activity reports (SARs). The FIUs are organised, resourced and 
staffed very differently across the member states — even their legal bases differ substantially — and 
their performance leaves much to be desired. According to figures from Europol, out of the 1.1 million 
SARs reported across the EU in 2019, only 10% have been further investigated by public authorities 
(with large differences between countries), and only 1.1% of criminal profits are eventually confiscated 
at the EU level. Moreover, FIU.net, the EU platform of FIUs, can for some byzantine political reason no 
longer be hosted by Europol but is searching for a new home, meaning that any debate on its functioning 
is now delayed indefinitely, further reducing AML efficacy.  
To be credible, AML policies need strong enforcement mechanisms. But here as well, there are many 
flaws. AML-related crimes are treated differently across the EU. For the “hard core” money-laundering 
matters, cooperation among prosecutors remains tentative, too slow to tackle cross-border cases. The 
recent creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) will facilitate collaboration, but its 
mandate is limited to European Union financial interests, and it will take time to become effective. For 
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“soft” money laundering, such as tax avoidance, approaches differ widely across the EU as to whether 
this should be considered a crime or an administrative offence.  
Given the diversity of approaches and structures in the member states related to money laundering and 
law enforcement, turning parts of the AML directive into a regulation is a step forward, but it is not a 
panacea: The regulation will need to be well formulated, an outcome that cannot be guaranteed given 
the decision-making process. In addition, the regulatory framework does not resolve the problem of 
lack of cooperation between FIUs and law enforcement authorities. Regulations assume the same type 
of situation across all member states, but the threats faced by them, the types of criminality, their 
modus operandi, criminal culture and groupings differ widely, so a regulation could reduce flexibility 
and counter the risk-based approach that ensures resources are targeted where they are needed. There 
is little investment devoted to AML enforcement – tiny in comparison to the costs of AML compliance 
for financial institutions – and monies need to be targeted wisely. Any rule therefore needs to cover 
those areas that are suited to a regulation and must not defeat flexibility and targeting. 
Let it be clear, there has been no shortage of (verbal) action at the international and EU levels on AML 
and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). In this report, we focus mostly on the EU and the 
international dimension. Plenty of good analysis on money laundering is available, on what does not 
work, and on why it is so difficult to make headway against it. However, good data on money laundering 
and underlying criminality are missing; most are approximations based on no, or dubious, statistical 
models. While gaining a clear picture of money laundering and underlying criminality is a challenge, 
given the nature of such activity, without it there is no effective course of action. Authorities could start 
by improving feedback on the process, extent of illicit activity and trends in criminal behaviour, reports 
submitted, cases acted upon, and, critically, what results are obtained. 
AML is affected by market and technological developments. Technology can facilitate the monitoring of 
money-laundering activities by private entities and notification to public authorities. Closer cooperation 
between both can also be a way forward, but the framework needs to be correctly structured, to take 
mandate, justice, effectiveness, data protection and competition policy concerns into account. 
This task force notes and recommends: 
PILLAR ONE: Governance Observations and Recommendations 
At the regulatory level: 
- Enforcement of current AML directives in an effective manner, which has an impact on 
underlying criminality, is key. This should not be a matter of ’compliance for compliance’s sake’. 
The EU member states are still behind with implementation of the fourth and fifth AML 
directives, which need to be implemented urgently and applied. These updates contain key 
elements for an effective AML framework; 
- Turning the directive into a regulation is recommended, to ensure a single set of rules across 
the EU, but much depends on the exact formulation, its coverage and the final outcome of the 
decision process. The EU will need to be mindful regarding a proper definition of money 
laundering, along with the objective of the money laundering regime. This needs to include a 
nexus to the underlying criminality, and be in compliance with the principles of proportionality 
and fundamental rights; 
- Enforcement is also critical for the 2000 directive on criminal offences that created the Financial 
Investigation Units (FIUs), which was recently updated, with 2021 as the implementation 
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deadline. The judicial process across the Member States could do with more co-ordination, 
especially in relation to cross border cases and with third countries; 
- In relation to new laws, properly structured benefit/cost analysis and regulatory impact analysis 
is needed. If there is no discernible impact on underlying criminality there should be no new 
laws. There is no point saddling obliged entities with more compliance burdens, which would 
merely hinder normal economic activity and have little impact on crime; 
- Structure of new laws is one thing; effectiveness and efficiency quite another. Crucially, we must 
focus on measuring what matters. We recommend a switch to using objectives and key results 
(OKRs) which will improve effectiveness. The linkages between AML and underlying predicate 
offences need focus, otherwise we stay in a regime of compliance for compliance sake with zero 
impact. 
At the supervisory level: 
- Action should start at member state level to streamline AML supervisory structures, to allow for 
better cooperation between those involved within member states, vertically as well as 
horizontally, as well as across the EU and internationally; 
- At the financial supervisory level, given the urgency of the situation, priority should be given to 
working with the new AML Committee within the EBA, and upgrading this, with a dedicated 
governance structure within EBA, in close cooperation with the national supervisory authorities 
and the European Central Bank (ECB);  
- A single agency raises questions about the scope and competences, mandate, legal base, 
powers, accountability, governance and funding. Many potential models exist, on which there 
is no clarity as yet. It also raises concerns about the supervision of the non-financial sector. 
At the enforcement level: 
- Joint action regarding the proper functioning of FIUs at national level, and their cooperation at 
the EU level is recommended. The nature, specific powers and tasks of the FIUs should be better 
harmonised. The EU-wide interconnection of the FIUs is in limbo after a decision from the 
European Data Protection Supervisor that the FIU.net platform can no longer be hosted by 
Europol because of data protection reasons. Policy makers need to urgently address FIU 
cooperation at EU level; 
- The member states should establish a uniform template for suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) and SARs, to be integrated in the centralised platform, FIU.net (though this should not 
be the only way for obliged entities to communicate intelligence to FIUs); 
- Data sharing between enforcement bodies involved (including the judiciary) needs to be 
improved, including across national borders. This relates not just to types of data but amounts 
and the speed of data sharing, and its security.  
Regarding data protection and identity verification: 
- Much remains to be done in this domain, even at the EU level. Registries of ultimate beneficial 
owners (UBOs) need to be better structured and accessible, and Legal Entity Identifiers (LEIs) 
more widely used. This applies as well for the EU in its dealings with third countries. Even before 
considering ultimate beneficial ownership, the utility of data held by general corporate 
registries—their type, amount, accessibility, searchability and granularity—needs to be 
addressed. Certain registries have taken backward steps in recent years, removing information 
on shareholders, addresses, accounts, dates of birth, etc. This only makes due diligence harder.  
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At the societal level: 
- Well-functioning AML systems are based upon close cooperation between the public and 
private sectors. The private sector is at the forefront in detecting cases and transmitting 
information to the authorities. In many countries, the vast majority of the investigative capacity 
(in some cases up to 95%) is housed in the private sector. A framework needs to be set for 
secure information exchange between them, respecting distinct mandates, data protection, 
free competition and professional secrecy. Taking examples from progress in fighting 
corruption, a lot of the success will come from the achievement of cultural change.  
- Public/private data sharing is exemplified by groups of financial institutions sharing anti-fraud 
data, and nascent versions of public/private partnerships such as joint money-laundering 
intelligence teams (in the UK, the Baltic and Nordic states) and the Europol Financial Intelligence 
Public Private Partnership. 
At all levels: 
- There is no doubt that governance capabilities at each level need to be reviewed to ensure that 
all relevant parties are connected and can communicate effectively and efficiently with each 
other. Governance is not merely about structure, however, and the decision-making processes 
need to be reassessed, in terms of both quality and speed. From a review by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) of AML policies to implementation of its recommendations by member states 
has taken more than a decade. That is clearly far too long. 
 
PILLAR TWO: Risk Management Observations and Recommendations 
Adopt objectives and key results (OKRs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) which relate to the 
underlying criminal threats which AML laws are intended to impact. These need to be thought through, 
rather than being measures which are adopted purely as they are. The right metrics are needed to 
combat the threat. Data collection techniques in this area are also in need of improvement. 
- Allow firms to develop and use risk-based systems to improve effectiveness; 
- Carry out effective benefit/cost analysis (rather than cost/benefit analysis) of proposed new 
measures; 
- Adopt active, coordinated defences, rather than the static three lines of defence model. 
 
PILLAR THREE: Capability Observations and Recommendations 
Growing money laundering threats require strengthened capabilities and tools. 
- Encourage training and spending on specialised financial police; 
- Increase funding and support of law enforcement, particularly of undercover operations and IT 
systems, enabling law enforcement to follow the money trail from commission of crimes; 
- Improve training standards to a new EU level, including the courts process, policy makers, 





It has been more than three decades since the Sommet de l’Arche in Paris established the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering. So where have we come to in Europe, and what 
remains to be done? 
Curtailing money laundering has been around as a policy objective for a long time, but the target has 
broadened significantly. From crime and drug-trafficking-related proceeds, the mandate has grown over 
the past two decades to include tax eavsion, terrorist financing, human trafficking, state-sponsored and 
corporate bribery. Europol now monitors 44 crimes. At the same time, the breadth and means to 
launder money have also increased. Liberalisation of capital movements internationally, the single 
market, technological progress and competition for instant international payments have multiplied the 
challenges for banks and money transmitters, as well as for supervisors. The cases uncovered continue 
to be a small fraction of the 2% - 5% of global GDP (€1.7-4 trillion) that is estimated to be laundered 
annually. 
Money laundering has been criminalised not just in Europe but the world over. Predicate offences have 
widened from drug trafficking to the proceeds of all crimes. Europol has established itself internationally 
in anti–money laundering (AML) terms. The Egmont Group has grown into a large international 
organisation of 159 financial intelligence units, representing the operational arm of AML/combating 
financing of terrorism (CFT) deterrence to complement the strategic arm of the FATF. Fifteen EU 
Member States (plus the European Commission) are direct FATF members, and the remaining thirteen 
are members of Moneyval, the European regional version of FATF. Moneyval also includes non-
EU/European Economic Area (EEA) member states such as Russia and Ukraine.  
The term ‘money laundering’, unheard of in 1989, is now in common parlance. However, the amount 
of proceeds of crime recovered as a result of successful money-laundering prosecutions, as compared 
to the amount thought to be actually laundered, is around 1% at best. It is small wonder that commission 
of the predicate offences remains rife and is increasing, particularly in relation to emerging criminality, 
such as cybercrime, wildlife and other environmental crimes. So why is the European AML system so 
ineffective in reducing the impact of the underlying crimes upon European citizens, and what can we do 
about it? 
Public awareness of the extent and the reach of the problem has grown a lot, certainly since the financial 
crisis, as has the expectation that it will be adequately addressed. There is still a long way to go, however, 
in terms of changing not just the perception of AML but the culture necessary to defeat money 
laundering. Authorities have over the past few years stepped up their actions against laundering, as 
evidenced by several high-profile cases in Europe and elsewhere. European policy makers have 
indicated that the current approach is not sufficient and are consulting on what steps to take to move 
forward. Some countries have even called for the creation of a new EU-wide body. 
In this context, CEPS decided to launch a task force to debate and propose effective solutions for Europe. 
There is certainly no shortage of studies and reports on AML, by international bodies, EU institutions, 
advisors and experts on the challenges faced. However, when looking at these, we found that many 
studies take a highly specific view of money laundering, from a certain niche perspective, or merely 
describe the various legal frameworks, without adopting an all-encompassing strategic view or looking 
at the efficacy of the system overall. Effective policies to tackle money laundering require the full 
involvement of the private sector, which is a key contributor to defend against it. This is in the private 
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sector’s interest since the costs of non-compliance have rocketed, as shown in some recent cases, and 
have started to affect financial stability.  
2. Objective 
Attempting to halt, or at least significantly reduce money laundering is a moral imperative in any 
democratic society, where all citizens are free and equal under the law, in a fair system of cooperation. 
A democratic regime comprises political institutions which guarantee citizens’ rights and obligations, 
with a responsible and accountable executive, an independent judiciary and a freely elected 
representative assembly of citizens, set in a constitution with suitable and effective checks and balances 
to avoid misuse of power.  
Laundering the proceeds of criminal, illegal or black market activities should in any open democracy be 
dealt with forcefully, as it undermines the very fabric of society and its political institutions. Such actions 
require a firm, immediate and effective reaction. Lack of clarity, delays and inefficiency will only invite 
further money laundering; it will be like an infectious disease that spreads further and deeper. Questions 
may be raised about the responsiveness of policy makers, however, considering the fairly recent focus 
on money laundering in policy, particularly on the law enforcement side, and given the disconnect 
between money laundering itself, which can seem to be a victimless offence, and the ravages of the 
predicate crimes. 
Despite all the reports, there are few good data available about extent of money laundering or the 
underlying predicate offences, and such data as there are may be held in a variety of different places. 
Most available data are of a macro nature, based upon proxies and estimates. Existing numbers are 
derived from rough projections of the size of the shadow economy or estimates based upon foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows compared to real investment, or the role of shell companies (see Unger, 
2020, for an overview). A good regulatory process should in essence start here, but obviously, in this 
case, this is not easy, as criminals do not declare their activities. In the EU, tax evasion alone is estimated 
at €825 bn. Tax avoidance adds another €150 bn.  
Bringing the different data together in an official barometer of money laundering could provide 
indications of the success of the policy. Such a barometer in fact exists, but it needs to be revisited. The 
private venture Basel AML Index measures the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in 141 
countries around the world, defined broadly as a country’s vulnerability to money laundering/terrorist 
financing and its capacities to counter it. It covers 16 indicators in five domains at the country level, 
regarding quality of the framework, bribery and corruption, financial transparency, public accountability 
and political risk. But it classifies as ‘low risk’ European countries such as Bulgaria in 4th, Montenegro in 
16th and Croatia in 22nd place, for example, countries that all have much lower rankings for 
Transparency International (respectively the 74th, 66th and 63rd, on a total of 180 countries).  
The Basel Index is also in contrast to the designation of Major Money Laundering countries in the US 
annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which lists (without ranking) Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain for the EU, but also the UK and the US itself. Overall, the Basel AML Index gives the 
impression that smaller jurisdictions, very often without any serious financial market infrastructure, are 
the countries which are at high risk in relation to money laundering. However, money launderers need 
serious financial markets in which to operate effectively, and the general view worldwide is that the 
major financial centres are also the major places for money laundering, which the US report confirms. 
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This shows the difficulty of compiling a general index for such purposes and avoiding political 
considerations in order to produce intelligence of value, relevance and accuracy for financial 
institutions. 
Many resources are being spent on confronting money laundering, in both the public and private 
spheres. Thousands of civil servants control tax declarations; financial investigation units and the police 
monitor suspicious transactions and activities. Financial institutions, and other entities dealing with cash 
transactions, employ thousands of staff purely to check huge numbers of false positives generated by a 
computer surveillance programme (this is often 95% - 98% of the total number flagged), let alone carry 
out investigations or proactive due diligence. Increasingly, it is also a matter for a financial institution’s 
proprietary information technology to detect unusual transactions, often using algorithms that they will 
have to explain to authorities one day. 
3. Definition and scope of current regulation 
One of the first instances of money laundering in the literature arises two thousand years ago. The 
monies used to bribe Judas to betray Jesus ended up being spent on the purchase of some fields outside 
Jerusalem, known as the ‘Fields of Blood’. It gives us the expression ‘blood money’. The term money 
‘laundering’ dates back to the gangster Al Capone, who in the 1920s kept his illegally obtained cash in a 
washing machine. The initial definition as developed by the FATF referred specifically to the proceeds 
of drug trafficking that were recycled in the official banking system. The definition was gradually 
enlarged to include the proceeds of any criminal enterprise, and after 2001, terrorist financing, 
corruption and tax evasion.  
Regulating money laundering is difficult because the concept is elusive; it is a moving target. It is 
dependent on circumstances of time, place and the groups under scrutiny. The U.S. Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970 represents the historic starting point for efforts to detect and sanction money laundering, though 
the term was not commonly used until the early 1990s. Banks were (and still are) required to provide 
information to the Department of the Treasury concerning transactions involving more than $10,000 in 
cash, whether or not that transaction was thought to be suspicious (so-called Cash Transaction Reports, 
or CTRs). The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was explicitly a component of the U.S. war on 
drugs, specifically cocaine from Latin America. From then on, money-laundering regulation has 
expanded in scope, depth and geographical reach. 
Regulation has to take into account the practical mechanisms of money laundering, often described by 
the FATF as having three sequential elements: placement, layering and integration. Placement is the 
introduction of the funds into the financial system, whether through cash deposits or more complex, 
advanced methods. Layering is a set of activities intended to distance the funds from their point of 
criminal origin. Integration involves converting “illegal proceeds into apparently legitimate business 
earnings through normal financial or commercial operations”. In actual fact, few laundering operations 
follow these steps precisely, or in that order, and they often have different features altogether. Nor do 
any AML laws worldwide distinguish offences on the basis of placement, layering or integration, so this 
has become a case of jargon and does not necessarily recognise the ingenuity or fluidity of laundering 
schemes. 
In addition, regulation must be adapted to the specific payment practices of the financial sector, their 
interconnectedness through correspondent banking accounts, the role of the central banks in providing 
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payments infrastructure and the competitive context. Central to AML rules is customer due diligence 
(CDD), but there is little agreement as to what this should cover, in terms of depth, breadth or quality. 
The general corporate and other registries of the EU member states do not help much with performing 
CDD. The banking sector is increasingly challenged by non-bank payment providers, which have 
managed to take a lot of market share over recent years, and even more since the Covid crisis (the 
business-to-consumer payment market worldwide alone is estimated at €30 trillion). This competition 
puts pressure on the banks to increase the speed of payments and reduce their costs. 
In a world of almost completely free capital flows (save for certain instances of exchange controls), any 
regulation must be international in scope; otherwise, it is like ‘fighting windmills’. Hence the role of the 
FATF in establishing 40 key principles for the combat of money laundering and terrorist financing, in 
carrying out mutual evaluations of FATF members, in liaising with FATF-style organisations such as 
Moneyval, in blacklisting non-cooperative jurisdictions, in taking action against bank secrecy or 
anonymous accounts. Even in the EU, this has not been easy, as the 2003 decision on the savings tax 
directive proved, with 10-year transition periods for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, and the request 
for a similar commitment from third countries, including Switzerland and offshore financial centres. On 
the other side, there is the extraterritorial application of rules and sanctions. International organisations 
such as the UN, and countries such as the United States, often impose sanctions, and fines for non-
compliance, even for foreign-based entities, or even merely in relation to entities’ usage of the USD as 
the currency of the transaction concerned. The US is by far the most sanctioning country, but the 
effectiveness of sanctions has to be questioned, and there is often a political dimension to sanctions, 
such as in relation to Iran for example.  
Strict AML supervision is also required from a macro perspective. Excessive dependence on dark and 
undocumented accounts increases the vulnerability of a financial regime to sudden shocks, on which 
more research could be done.1 It creates holes in the financial system if large amounts suddenly seem 
to be fraudulent or tainted. This is even more the case for smaller financial centres, as evidenced in the 
cases of Cyprus or Malta and the impact of the Greek financial crisis. The size of fines is unpredictable, 
and can lead to international tensions, as was the case with the 2014 fine of $9 billion on BNPParibas 
by U.S. authorities for processing transactions for nations subject to U.S. sanctions. That wiped out the 
entire revenue of the bank for the year. On the other hand, some fines are never paid—the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission recently disclosed that this was the case for 50% of the fines it 
levied. Other countries have proposed a financial crime levy to assist governments in fighting financial 
crime. But this seems hard to justify against the huge fine revenue extracted from banks.  
Principles of better regulation, with focus on ex ante (and ex post) impact assessments, benefit/cost 
and regulatory impact analysis, consultation, and application of the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity should be applied to AML efforts. Any new law in this domain should be very well justified 
as a result of rigorous impact assessments demonstrating necessity, proportionality and fundamental 
rights compliance, in particular privacy and data protection. Further, there is the need for effective 
enforcement of the rules and analysis of the impact on underlying criminality. Until recently, the cost of 
laundering money has appeared to be quite low.  
Regulating money laundering is a classic collective choice problem. If not properly regulated and 
enforced, the temptation will be high for a bank to accept dirty money and ‘clean’ it. If not, the nearest 
competitor will do it, and there are examples of criminal organisations learning from rejection by one 
 
1 More research could be done along the 1996 Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering publication by 
the IMF. 
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financial institution and opening with ease at others (not necessarily with complicity or negligence on 
the part of the latter but as the criminals honed a better front story). Unless there are clear rules in 
place, properly monitored, with a strong enforcement culture, laundering will continue to happen. Even 
if the sector could regulate itself, laundering could occur elsewhere, anywhere cash or near cash can be 
used, in whatever form.  
In the EU context, the rules have to take into account the functioning of the single market for financial 
institutions and payment providers, with home-country control. They should comply with the key Treaty 
freedoms of free movement of capital, people and goods and free provision of services throughout. 
From the law enforcement perspective, the EU is much less advanced, and national legislation differs as 
to what may be classified simply as an administrative offence, rather than a full-blown crime. The result 
is that illegality does not always equate to criminality. 
In order to have a better chance of securing compliance with the aims of AML, there need to be clean 
lines of authority. This is at its base a combination of clarity of aim and legislation, as well as political 
leadership. One secondary aspect is the behaviour of all the relevant groups concerned, moving the 
balance of benefit/cost analysis, and making better use of peer group pressure and other psychological 
techniques, creating a strong AML culture across the EU.2 Another is the control dimension. This is 
where compliance gets expensive in terms of costs of monitoring, supervision, detection, investigation, 
prosecution and enforcement. So from a policy effectiveness standpoint, more comprehensive 
authority and an improved culture will lessen the enforcement burden. Regard must be paid to the 
possibility of distortions, whether by governments, for example, by ordering law enforcement to focus 
on money laundering relating only to missing trader intra community (MTIC) fraud (concerning abuse 
of the value-added tax (VAT) regime), or by markets, where CEOs, who are rewarded for the profitability 
of their institutions, are tempted to turn a blind eye to due diligence. Finally, avoiding error is critical, 
whether by instituting effective training programmes (including training of police and the judiciary in 
the workings of financial markets and their abuse by launderers) or by ensuring that governance 
structures are comprehensive, the decision-making process is smooth and justifiable, and the daily 
rhythm works efficiently. 
3.1 International and European AML policy 
The consensus to tackle money laundering stemming from drug trafficking led to the creation of the 
Financial Action Task Force in 1989 by the G-7. Today, the FATF is the driving force in fight against money 
laundering internationally. The group initially consisted of 15 OECD member countries and the European 
Commission, but it was gradually enlarged to include what are now the 37 member countries and a 
network of nine regional FATF-style bodies, totalling 205 member countries. The FATF, by setting 
standards and adopting recommendations, works mostly through peer group pressure but has gained 
considerable influence. Its recommendations are referred to in a variety of international instruments, 
such as the UN Security Council resolutions against terrorism and the EU’s AML directives, which have 
in turn reinforced its legitimacy. 
 
2 Psychologists often categorise target groups as falling into three categories for compliance purposes. The first 
20% are usually compliant and will always be so. There is another 20% at the other end of the scale, who are rarely 
compliant. The 60% in the middle are thought to be compliant to some degree or another, depending to some 
extent on their view of the benefit cost equation for them of the scenario which they face. They are the 
opportunists, who may decide against compliance if they feel they can “get away with it”, or if they are non- 
compliant that the penalty will be insignificant. 
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Key elements of the work of the FATF are: 
- Typologies of money laundering: identifying risks and methods used by criminals and terrorists 
to access the financial system or otherwise launder proceeds or obfuscate funding. This work 
has evolved from annual to ad hoc reports. Recent work focuses on virtual assets and their use 
in illicit transactions, and illegal wildlife trafficking; 
- The recommendation to create financial intelligence units (FIUs): independent agencies tasked 
with receiving and analysing suspicious transactions from financial institutions and other 
obliged entities (by which is meant those entities which fall to be regulated under an AML 
regime). The FIUs are gathered internationally under the Egmont Group, a network of 165 
countries’ FIUs, for information and expertise sharing; 
- A mutual evaluation process to assess the implementation of FATF recommendations. It checks, 
through a peer monitoring system, the technical compliance and effectiveness of a member 
states with 11 ‘immediate outcomes’ (see Table 4 below in Pillar 2 Risk Management); 
- A blacklisting of non-cooperative jurisdictions and public warnings about high-risk jurisdictions. 
The International Cooperation Review Group now regularly reviews countries that pose a risk 
for the financial system and makes public statements. 
Despite these successes, FATF standards have been developed by a single-agenda ad hoc body with 
selective membership and a limited degree of transparency and accountability in its operations. FATF is 
an expert body that serves to depoliticise the discussion on AML typologies and measures, but 
happening outside the normal political processes and scrutiny. Its recommendations are presented as 
given, and the recommendations have been mostly adopted without criticism by the EU Commission 
and legislators. In this sense, the process has been legitimised at EU and global level, by FATF and non-
FATF members, it is argued. The FATF is thus constrained by its structure as an intergovernmental body. 
Its effectiveness and efficiency could be improved by an annual monitoring of areas of criminality to 
identify trends, rather than focus on identifying ‘new typologies’. It too could do with addressing objectives 
and key results (OKRs) of the regime, in order to increase effectiveness. Furthermore, it can take many 
years for changes to FATF recommendations to be translated into national laws and countermeasures, as 
the FATF has no or limited power of enforcement; it mostly works through peer pressure.  
Table 1. AML multi-actor structures and networks 
 
 Global EU – Europe Member states 
Regulatory policy FATF EU institutions 
Moneyval 
National institutions 
Supervision  Basel Committee/FSB ECB/EBA/ESAs/EDPS 
(EU Agency) 
Central bank, FSA, 
specialised supervisor 
Investigation Egmont Group Europol/FIU.net FIU 









PPPs  EFIPPP JMLIT, SAMLIT, AMLC, etc. 
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The EU was the first international jurisdiction to adopt a comprehensive framework on AML, following 
up on the FATF 40 Recommendations but through binding acts and directives, enforceable before the 
European Court of Justice. In the various directives on AML, the EU has followed the FATF work by 
gradually expanding the scope of money laundering predicate offences. Academics have compared this 
extension to ‘a chameleon’ adjusted to provide responses to every security threat arising. This raises 
questions regarding the observance of the principle of legality at EU level and the extent to which policy 
choices in these fields may lead to uncritical over-criminalisation. The danger of this approach is the 
failure to distinguish between the essential features behind the criminal and regulatory response to tax 
offences on the one hand, and serious and organised crime on the other (Mitselegas and Vavoula, 2016). 
Indeed, the EU directives still do not include a harmonised definition of money laundering, which has 
been one of the problems obstructing proper implementation by the member states. Failure to 
implement fully the fourth AML directive led the EU Commission on 2 July 2020 to refer Austria, Belgium 
and the Netherlands to the European Court of Justice, with a request for financial sanctions. The 
incomplete implementation by these countries concerns fundamental aspects of the anti–money 
laundering framework, such as betting and gambling legislation (Austria), mechanisms under which the 
financial intelligence units exchange documents and information (Belgium), and the information to be 
provided on the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities (Netherlands). Proceedings 
against two member states are pending before the Court, and three other member states have received 
reasoned opinions. Also, the FATFs assessment of the 19 EU member states implementation of its 
‘immediate outcomes’ is mixed at best (see Table 3 below).  
An overview of the five EU AML directives largely mirrors the extension of the scope of money 
laundering and development of the 40 Recommendations within the FATF. The function of FIUs was the 
subject of a separate decision. 
- The First AML Directive (91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991) defined money laundering as the proceeds 
of criminal activity, in particular but not only from drug trafficking. It required member states to 
ensure that financial institutions require identification of their customers when opening an 
account, and for every transaction above €15,000. All the information regarding suspected 
transactions should be forwarded to the national authorities responsible for combating money 
laundering, the FIUs. It established a ‘Contact Committee’ to facilitate the harmonised 
implementation of the directive; 
- The role of and cooperation among FIUs was elaborated in a Council decision (2000/642/JHA of 
17 October 2000). As “there should be an improvement in cooperation between contact points 
competent to receive suspicious transaction reports pursuant to Council Directive 91/308/EEC”, 
it defines the role and the modalities of cooperation between FIUs. This follows changes to 
improve police and judicial cooperation in the EU further to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). This 
decision was recently replaced and extended by an EU directive (2019/1153 of 20 June 2019);   
- The Second AML Directive (2001/97/EC of 4 December 2001) extended the scope of the previous 
one in terms of both the crimes covered and the range of professions and activities cited as having 
potential responsibility—auditors, accountants, tax advisors, real estate agents, dealers in high 
values, casinos, notaries and lawyers;  
- The Third AML Directive (2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005) forbade anonymous accounts and 
obliged financial institutions to apply customer due diligence provisions, including investigation 
of possible terrorist financing. It repeats the obligation for member states to establish an FIU;   
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- The Fourth AML Directive (2015/849 of 20 May 2015) considerably broadened the previous ones 
and emphasised ‘tax crimes’ as a predicate for money laundering. It paid more attention to the 
matters of supervision and sanctioning than the preceding directives. It requires the EU to identify 
high-risk third countries, nations with deficiencies in their AML policies. It requests the EU 
Commission to make a biannual assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing risks 
affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities. It had to be implemented by 
26 June 2017; 
- The Fifth AML Directive (2018/843 of 30 May 2018) focused on enhanced powers for FIUs and 
supervisory authorities to obtain direct access to information and demanded increased 
transparency around beneficial ownership and trusts. It also extends the scope of obliged entities 
to virtual currency exchanges, hence covering bitcoin and other digital currencies. The member 
states were required to translate this directive into national legislation by 10 January 2020. 
The weakness of these legal instruments is that they are in the form of directives, which leave member 
states broad leeway when it comes to implementation: they did not harmonise the definition of the 
crime and the sanctions applied, for the reasons discussed above. The advantage is that it gives member 
states the opportunity to tailor implementation of the directives to local circumstances, and to go 
further (thus enabling a risk-based approach). The fourth directive considerably enlarged the scope of 
what is considered a criminal offence in money laundering, extending to ‘fraud’, ‘corruption’, “tax 
crimes relating to direct taxes and indirect taxes and as defined in the national law of the Member 
States”. The latter is further explained in recital 11, which states: “While no harmonisation of the 
definitions of tax crimes in Member States' national law is sought, Member States should allow, to the 
greatest extent possible under their national law, the exchange of information or the provision of 
assistance between EU Financial Intelligence Units.” A further clarification would be required to 
facilitate cross-border judicial and police cooperation in this domain. Yet if tax evasion is not an offence 
under national law, why would an FIU exchange information? 
In the meantime, the revision of the EU treaties, the Lisbon Treaty (2009), provided the possibility for 
the EU to set minimum rules, by unanimity, concerning the definition of criminal offences, which include 
illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment and computer crime (Article 83). This has not yet happened, however. In 2012, the EU 
Commission proposed a legislative act on that basis, and again in 2016, but it was not adopted by the 
member states, indicating that various approaches co-exist. 
The draft Fifth AML Directive was accompanied by an extensive impact assessment (2016) of different 
options to strengthen the EU's existing framework to fight terrorism and to enhance transparency with 
respect to beneficial owners of corporate entities and trusts. The impact assessment only covered 
additional benefits that could be generated by the proposed targeted amendments but did not make 
an attempt to quantify the costs of regulating AML for the service providers. To our knowledge, no such 
cost assessment was made on the AML measures in the EU to date, but many numbers have been 
circulated on the basis of private-sector surveys, most often rough estimates. The 2016 report further 
analysed various means for better cooperation among FIUs, adding that there was no appetite among 
member states for an EU-wide FIU. It also looked into the impact of virtual currencies.  
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3.2 The new AML role of EBA in the ESA regulation review 
The difficulty of making progress on the basis of Lisbon Treaty Article 83, and the need for a more 
harmonised approach pushed the EU to propose a more important role in AML for the European 
Banking Authority (EBA). This was announced as part of Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
last State of the Union speech in 2018, as a new amendment to the Review of the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) regulations. The amendment was adopted by the end of 2019 and is being 
implemented. 
The amendments give a unique central coordination and information-sharing role to the EBA, in 
cooperation with national authorities, the other ESAs and the European Central Bank (ECB) in the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing (Article 9a of the ESA review). The EBA has a new 
statutory objective to prevent the abuse of the financial system by money laundering and terrorist 
financing. This means that it has to consider AML/CFT issues in all its activities. 
The EBA has the legal obligation to set the standard, coordinate and monitor the EU financial sector’s 
AML/CFT efforts.  
- Standard setting: By setting EU standards as to how supervisors and financial institutions should 
comply with AML/CFT rules in a proportionate, risk-based manner, EBA can ensure that these 
are implemented consistently and effectively across the EU. The amendments create a new 
Standing Committee within EBA, the AMLSC, to coordinate measures and to prepare all draft 
decisions for the Board of Supervisors (see the mandate). It is composed of member states’ 
relevant authorities, a representative of the other ESAs and the ECB. 
- Coordinate: The EBA established new supervisory colleges of AML/CFT supervisors, which in 
some instances convert existing ones, to foster effective cooperation and information exchange 
between competent authorities responsible for AML and prudential supervision, as well as with 
other authorities, like FIUs: 
o This gives supervisors much more information on risks and allows them to learn from 
each other more quickly and effectively; 
o FATF considers AML/CFT colleges an international good practice;  
o The EBA participates in the discussions and monitors them. It also provides feedback to 
the competent authorities on the functioning of the colleges and on other issues, 
including the supervision of particular institutions;  
o If there is a third-country dimension, the EBA will have a leading coordination role. In 
case a country or dependency is on the list of non-cooperative money laundering 
jurisdictions, the EBA shall not conclude equivalence agreements (Article 33, ESA 
review). This may soon raise problems for the UK in its dealings with offshore financial 
centres in British Overseas Territories, such as the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands 
and Gibraltar. 
All necessary colleges should be set up by January 2022. 
- Monitor: EBA shall develop draft regulatory standards to identify risks and vulnerabilities in 
AML/CFT supervision, as well as standards on information sharing between competent 
authorities. In February 2020, the results of the first round of the EBA’s AML Implementation 
review were published. They assess the approaches of a selection of competent authorities and 
issue recommendations for all supervisory authorities. 
10 | CEPS-ECRI TASK FORCE REPORT 
 
The EBA has also been given the power to: 
- Ask competent authorities to investigate individual financial institutions when it believes that 
they are in breach of AML rules, and to consider imposing sanctions (Article 9b, ESA review). 
Where an authority does not comply with the request, the EBA may take direct action toward 
the financial institution in question (Article 19e). 
- Carry out peer reviews of competent authorities on their fitness to tackle AML risks.  
- Set up a central AML/CFT database to collect and store all information on weaknesses of 
individual financial institutions’ systems that competent authorities have identified. The 
database will be used to analyse risks and share information. There will be a technical 
consultation at the end of this year or the beginning of next year.  
- Where appropriate, transmit information to the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO).  
EBA resources for AML have increased with introduction of the new rules (from two to seven full-time 
staff up to thirteen full-time staff in 2021). Twenty EBA staffers are trained on AML/CFT issues in relation 
to prudential supervision, governance and internal control. However, considering the broad scope of 
the EBA’s mandate, these resources remain limited when compared to the depth of the problem and 
the number of persons working on prudential supervision at EU level, for example. At national level as 
well, insufficient resources dedicated to supervisors are a concern. 
With minimum harmonisation of the several AML directives, the potential for EBA to lead the way is 
limited. However, the new powers signal a move away from merely aggregating information toward a 
more proactive, preventive role. They strengthen information sharing and the supervision of individual 
financial entities. 
4. Pillar 1 AML Supervision 
4.1 AML supervision in the EU member states and the role of the SSM 
AML supervision is organised differently in the various EU member states, which renders EBA’s 
coordination task more difficult (see Table 6 at the end). The newly created AML Standing Committee 
of EBA brings together 57 different authorities from EU and EEA member countries in the financial 
sector alone. Two models can be distinguished, one with the central bank in charge, prevalent in the 
majority of member states, the other designating a Financial Services Authority (FSA) for supervisory 
purposes. In between are several hybrid models. This heterogeneity could be an argument for a single 
entity at European level, but it could also indicate how difficult it might be to have such an entity 
function efficiently, if responsibilities are spread over different competent authorities. Equally, a certain 
flexibility is required if implementation of a risk-based approach is to work for supervision. It is a fine 
balance to achieve, which needs to be guided by agreed objectives and results. On the non-financial 
side, the supervisory structure is even more complex, and depends on how a given profession is 
organised and how AML legislation translates in action, which is often carried out in a self-regulatory 
way. The Wirecard case, the payment company that went bankrupt, indicated that much remains to be 
done in the supervision of the audit profession. But there are also the accountants, notaries, gaming 
industries, real estate brokers, etc. Table 2 gives an overview of a national supervisory structure in the 
case of Sweden, for example. 
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Table 2. The AML supervisory structure in Sweden 
 
Note: This graph depicts the Swedish system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, as regulated chiefly by 
the Act on Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2017:630). The entities without a dedicated 
supervisory authority are defined in items 15–16, 18–19 and 21–22 in the second section of the Act and are subject to 
supervision by the County Administrative Boards of Skåne, Stockholm and Västra Götaland. The entities with a dedicated 
supervisory authority are defined in items 13–14, 17 and 20 in the same section and are subject to supervision by the Estate 
Agents Inspectorate, the Gambling Authority, the Inspectorate of Auditors and the Bar Association. 
Source: Government Offices of Sweden. 
 
Apart from EBA, member states are grouped in different constellations in other international fora, such 
as the FATF and Moneyval. There is no shortage of international networks, as show in Table 1 above. 
Analogy is often made to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to point to what an overarching 
agency could do in the domain of AML. Through the creation of the SSM within the ECB, the EU managed 
to overcome the diversity of prudential supervision structures in the member states and create a unitary 
body. An SSM-like structure could be set up by the EU for AML, with the supervision of the large cases 
(like the large banks) by the single agency, whereas small cases would be left to the member states. The 
big problem, however, is that the lists of the predicate offences to money laundering must refer to 
national law, and this is where the analogy with the SSM ends. The ECB can act directly all over the 
Eurozone, through the withdrawal of a licence in case EU law was violated, which an AML authority 
could not do since that particular competence remains national under the EU Treaty. 
At the same time, the SSM model raises questions about the role of the SSM itself. The SSM regulation 
limits the ECB’s task to prudential supervision of banks, while it notes in recital 29 that “the ECB should 
cooperate, as appropriate, fully with the national authorities which are competent to ensure a high level 
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of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering.” The SSM may, in its day-to-day tasks, 
come across many cases that could help to uncover money laundering, which need to be followed up 
as closely as possible. The ECB says that it takes into consideration the assessments of the AML/CFT 
supervisors in its prudential control. It can for example ask banks to strengthen governance 
arrangements or reassess board members and principal functionaries. The ECB can, as part of its fit and 
proper assessments, reject board members outright, although it depends on national authorities to 
share information on personal tax files.  
Ultimately, either national supervisors or the ECB can withdraw a banking licence in case of serious 
doubts about the business model of a bank, which the ECB did in the case of ABLV bank in July 2018 
(see below). However, it did so only after the U.S. Treasury in February uncovered blatant money 
laundering. This raised questions about the possible conflicts of interest within the ECB, as the governor 
of the central bank of Latvia should have been aware and sits on the Governing Council of the ECB. It 
led the ECB to publish disclaimers about its responsibility and limitations as prudential supervisor in case 
AML breaches occur. Several commentators argued that the ECB should have known, and called for a 
bigger role for the ECB in this domain. At the initiative of the ESAs, a multilateral agreement was signed 
in early 2019 between the ECB, the national competent authorities and the AML/CFT supervisors of 
banks in the EEA to clarify the exchange of information: it sets that the ECB and national competent 
authorities will share information with AML/CFT supervisors in member states and requires assessments 
from AML/CFT supervisory authorities at least once a year to support its annual supervisory review 
process.  
4.2 The role of the FIUs and Europol  
Less well known but critical to AML supervision is the role of the FIUs, and of Europol as the host of the 
network of FIUs. FIUs collect information about suspicious activity and some of them cooperate in cross-
border cases at the EU level with Europol, the European law enforcement agency. FIUs channel the 
information to the judicial authorities, but the overall recovery of illicit assets is not very effective (the 
rate of confiscation of criminal assets could be as low as 1.1% according to Europol).3 One of the central 
reasons for this lack of success is complexity in enforcement, with many different authorities and agents 
involved (bank supervisors, FIUs, tax authorities, customs, judicial authorities, etc.), which have different 
powers, history, structure, culture, training, tools and resources across the member states. The EU has 
a single market but not a single enforcement and judicial area. Improving cooperation among law 
enforcement and judicial authorities, and ensuring adequate resources and training, is essential. 
An FIU is “a central, national unit which, in order to combat money laundering, is responsible for 
receiving (and to the extent permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent 
authorities, disclosures of financial information which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are 
required by national legislation or regulation” (EU Council Decision 2000/642/JHA). FIUs process 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and suspicious activity reports (SARs) and forward these to the 
judicial authorities.  FIUs are most often part of finance ministries, a few of them being law enforcement 
bodies or located in the judiciary, but in some cases they are stand-alone independent agencies (see 
Table 6 for an overview). The EDPS called for a clarification on this point so that they do not include the 
police or judicial authorities. 
 
3 Europol, Does Crime still pay? Criminal Asset Recovery in the EU, Survey of Statistical information 2010-2014, 
2016, p. 4. 
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There have been long-standing problems with the functioning of FIUs: lack of staff, lack of information 
technology tools, competing demands, lack of cooperation from banking supervisors, and the 
undependable quality of intra-EU police reporting and coordination. The FIUs are nationally focused, 
and they are overwhelmed by thousands of STRs. Common templates for STRs, tools and standards, and 
support of joint analysis and training are being considered. At the same time, flexibility needs to be 
maintained and bureaucracy kept under control. The European Commission is examining various 
potential solutions. A single point of data gathering for STRs was proposed, but FIUs and national 
regulators are said not to be in favour of centralised filing. Their reasons include linguistic barriers, legal 
issues and subsidiarity, as well as the decentralised nature of markets, security and data protection. But 
also the ever-expanding and unclear money laundering concept in EU law makes it difficult for FIUs to 
focus. 
A Commission report on cooperation between FIUs sets out the scale and the depth of the problem:  
- Many FIUs face big operational problems, primarily related to funding but also to their structure 
and role. Trying to resolve these butts up against legal limitations in many member states; 
- The number of SARs made by reporting entities to FIUs is very dissimilar across the EU, although 
reporting has improved greatly in recent times (see Table 7); 
- Exchange of information between FIUs and cross-border reports have been sparse, although 
here, too, there has been improvement recently. FIU.net was set up for that very purpose, but 
it faces recurring problems. The EU Commission is currently looking into an appropriate 
structure for FIU.net, as Europol was judged no longer to be appropriate by the supervisor EDPS 
because of data privacy, and its mandate; 
- There is a need for more centralised monitoring of and support for FIUs; 
- Cooperation with prudential supervisors is currently extremely limited, often related to issues 
of confidentiality.  
Overall, it seems that the immediate problem for AML enforcement rests more with the FIUs, and the 
structure of cooperation among them, than with the financial supervisors. However, once these issues 
are sorted out, problems relating to judicial systems and prosecutorial authority will become more 
apparent. 
4.3 AML and related policies 
4.3.1 GDPR and data sharing 
The iconic General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2016, the pillar for data rights in the EU, is 
often seen as an obstacle to AML policies. However, in several of its provisions, GDPR is intended to be 
enabling in nature: it is not intended to block data processing but to ensure when and how data 
processing can be lawful. When in the public interest, the GDPR allows member states to restrict certain 
obligations and rights. Boldness and creativity should thus be encouraged in the field of AML to find 
practical ways to observe data protection principles while sharing information. Coordination between 
AML and data protection agencies and the setting of clear and simple guidelines is vital. 
The GDPR provides flexibility. Several provisions foresee making exceptions to data protection rules, in 
particular by allowing restrictions of individual rights when those are necessary in the fight against 
money laundering (recital 19, for example). Processing of data can be lawful for compliance with legal 
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obligations to which the data controller is subject (Article 6.1c) or for the performance of tasks in the 
public interest (Article 6.1e). In these cases, the right to be forgotten does not apply (Article 17.3). The 
rights of those subject to data collection, in particular, the rights of access, correction and blocking, can 
also be restricted by law if doing so is necessary and proportionate (Article 23). In addition, the 
European Court of Justice has recognised that AML can justify restrictions on human rights, which are 
also applicable for data protection. Nonetheless, the practicalities need to be tested more fully. 
AML legislation has never been considered particularly problematic by data protection authorities. 
However, in the early days, the data protection authorities of at least one Member State judged that 
individuals had a right to see the information disclosed about them in a Suspicious Activity Report. This 
is clearly at variance with tipping off provisions and under certain laws gives rise to an action for 
defamation. For the AML system to work, however, those disclosing suspicions need to have legal 
immunity from suit for breach of data protection laws and defamation laws. FIUs and those involved in 
the law enforcement process need to ensure that this sensitive information is held securely and not 
breached or leaked. However, in recent years, data processing and sharing measures have become 
more invasive by nature, with lower reporting thresholds, advanced technology and increased use for 
electronic payments, which allows banks and other providers to collect more information. A greater 
interest from the public in the impact of AML measures on personal privacy is expected, increasing the 
importance of explaining necessity and proportionality and setting clear and acceptable guidelines. 
Data controllers are accountable (Article 5 of the GDPR) for the processing of personal data. The 
responsibility to prove compliance lies with operators rather than supervisors. This can be achieved 
through documentation, data protection impact assessments, appointment of a data protection officer 
or other means.  
As regards proportionality, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), in charge of controlling 
the correct application of the GDPR, has issued guidelines on proportionality and a Necessity Toolkit. 
The EDPS encourages the following of a risk-based approach, clearly identifying the criteria for the 
assessment of money laundering risk and encouraging the use of these criteria when drafting and 
submitting SARs.  
The EDPS is the data protection supervisory authority of Europol, monitoring the processing of personal 
data relating to Europol’s activities. It is responsible for hearing and investigating complaints from 
people who believe that Europol mishandled their personal data. Europol relies on national competent 
authorities to provide them with the majority of the personal data it processes. Because of Europol’s 
current legal framework, the EDPS ruled that the decentralised network of FIUs (FIU.net) can no longer 
be hosted by Europol, as FIUs often deal with many suspicious activities outside the context of criminal 
law, and the framework for the exchange of such information between member states on FIU.net is 
inadequate. The European Commission is temporarily taking over the function of hosting the FIU.net 
system and assessing what form the future cooperation and support mechanism for FIUs will take. 
In its opinion on the EU Commission’s May 2020 AML communication, EDPS argued that public/private 
partnerships (PPPs) for the sharing of operational information on intelligence suspects by law 
enforcement authorities with obliged entities would result in a high risk for privacy rights and data 
protection. It also advised the Commission to be careful not to overstep the legal basis for PPPs to 
process personal data. Hence, while data sharing is increasingly seen as the way forward, the EDPS has 
warned strongly against it.  
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4.3.2 Integrated identification solutions 
The upside of GDPR is harmonised, eventually digital, integrated identification. While a lot has been 
done already by the EU in this domain, with the Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust 
Services (eIDAS) solutions and the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) registry, and internationally through 
the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), much remains to be done, certainly for FIUs. Correct and comprehensive 
application of these measures remains an issue, and too many private entities and countries continue 
to protect secrecy even in situations where it is unwarranted.  
Under the Fifth AML Directive, varying national customer identification and verification requirements 
are applicable across the EU. Fragmented national approaches to digital identity solutions are 
detrimental to the development of innovative cross-border solutions and the provision of cross-border 
financial services, adding to their costs and obstructing the fight against money laundering, as obliged 
entities need to collect data differently in each country. This is exacerbated by:  
- a myriad of identification and verification processes, which implies using different documents 
and formats; 
- diverse additional requirements, such as the use of certain delivery channels;  
- differing access rights or abilities with respect to public information that could be used for 
verification purposes;  
- constraints with respect to the portability and the reuse of customer due diligence data because 
of distinct approaches in member states toward reliance on third parties and uncertainties with 
regard to the application of the GDPR. As a result, there is little recycling of these data. 
The Fifth AML Directive requires member states to open up access to registries of the UBOs of 
companies, but there are still too many practical difficulties. Information can be incomplete or 
misleading. Access to and transparency of registries is not uniform. Arrangements can be made with 
third countries where identification is more difficult, such as Switzerland. Implementation of the 
directive in the member states is behind schedule: 17 of the 27 member states do not yet have a 
centralised registry with the beneficial owners of companies that is available to the public. Twelve 
member states have legal arrangements that allow the hiding of the UBO, according to a recent 
European Commission report. 
The use of a Legal Entity Identifier, mandated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) since the 2008 
financial crisis, could help to identify the UBO of entities, but here as well, much remains to be done by 
FSB members to disseminate its use. The LEI is an alphanumeric code developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) that enables clear and unique identification of legal entities 
participating in financial transactions. It serves to resolve inefficiencies in financial ecosystems like high 
costs due to matching based on names and weak controls, and adapts the name-based system to the 
digital world. It can facilitate retrieval of granular data from a variety of sources.  
Most FSB members’ jurisdictions have mandated that certain entities have an LEI. It has a coverage of 
close to 100% for derivatives markets, as well as a high percentage of securities and fixed-income 
markets, but its use remains far too low with respect to non-financial corporations. Only 1.77 million 
LEIs have been issued around the world to date. “LEI has far to go to meet the G-20’s objective”, 
according to a recent FSB report. Its utilisation is uneven across countries: it ranges from 2% to 7% of 
all eligible legal entities in Canada, the EU and the United States but is much lower elsewhere. More 
effort should be made both at national and international levels to promote LEI adoption. 
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For AML purposes, an LEI could contribute in five ways to making compliance more efficient and 
accurate:  
- Facilitating know-your-customer (KYC) processes, especially on a cross-border basis; 
- Facilitating more efficient screening and a reduction in false positives, enabling screening of 
real-time transactions; 
- Simplifying the management of lists; 
- Providing enhanced data analytics by using LEI as a correlation identifier; 
- Enabling more reactive capacity and better communication across investigative organisations;  
- Serving to validate beneficial owners where they have legal identifiers. 
GLEIF, the global foundation behind LEI, is working to use LEIs within digital certification systems and is 
devising a company identity that will give a person a one-stop verifiable credential that proves that he 
or she is representing a company. However, care should be taken to ensure that users are aware of LEI 
limitations, such as an erroneous interpretation that those with an LEI are somehow guaranteed to be 
free of financial crimes. 
For LEIs to be useful, adoption has to become more widespread, which requires sustained effort 
internationally.  
4.3.3 Fair taxation 
Somewhat surprisingly, tax avoidance only came up more recently in the scope of AML legislation, in 
the context of the Fourth AML Directive of 2015. The EU has also enacted legislation separately, 
following international focus on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), in the anti–tax avoidance 
directive of 2016 to ensure effective taxation. However, recent debates have shown that EU countries 
still have a long way to go since tax systems differ significantly in the EU, not just in relation to how they 
function but also in what is tolerated in terms of tax avoidance. An EU-wide fair taxation system, where 
different revenues are taxed evenly, remains far off.  
Corporate tax law harmonisation has barely advanced in the EU over recent years but has been more 
the subject of soft law measures, by which coordination among member states is promoted, as well as 
through state aid policy actions. In this way, the biggest distortions are addressed. But effective taxation 
is a moving target because of economic developments, such as in the digital economy and the growing 
importance of intangible asset classes. This makes tax systems no longer adapted to the new dynamics 
of generating revenues. 
Overall, average corporate tax rates have declined, whereas personal income tax rates have remained 
stable or even increased, which raises an issue of equity. When large corporations can easily avoid or 
minimise taxes through international tax planning, and if on top of that the system is no longer adapted 
to the increasing weight of intangibles, there is an urgent policy problem to be addressed. At 
international level, this is mostly in the hands of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which has been successful in addressing technical aspects of corporate taxes, 
such as transfer pricing, has taken action with regard to BEPS and is advancing on digital taxes. Work on 
blacklisting non-cooperative jurisdictions or tax havens has become more political, as the list was 
dropped in 2009, from 38 jurisdictions in 2000. The same process is happening in the context of the 
FATF non-cooperative jurisdictions initiative, where the blacklist is likewise becoming shorter. 
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The EU has in some sense followed the OECD. It also has two lists, an EU list of non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions and an EU high-risk third country (anti–money laundering) list. The tax jurisdiction and AML 
lists may overlap in terms of some of the countries they feature, but they have different objectives, 
criteria, compilation processes and consequences. The EU's non-cooperative tax jurisdiction list is in the 
hands of the EU Council, whereas the EU's AML list is established by the European Commission based 
on EU anti–money laundering rules. The high-risk third country (AML) list aims to safeguard the EU's 
financial system against excessive exposure to third countries with deficiencies in their AML/CTF 
regimes. Based on this list, banks and other obliged entities must apply higher due diligence controls to 
financial flows involving the high-risk third countries, if not they risk penalties or sanctions. It includes 
countries such as the Bahamas, Mauritius, and Pakistan. The EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions 
deals with the problems of potential erosion of member states' tax bases posed by third countries that 
do not comply with international good governance standards as applied to taxation. It is managed 
directly by the member states, through the Code of Conduct Group, with the support of the 
Commission. The list is composed of a grey list (including i.e. Morocco) and a separate black list 
(including i.e. Cayman Islands), the former of which responded to EU concerns on the way to being 
cooperative. The EU states that, as a result of this process, which started in 2017, 120 harmful tax 
regimes worldwide have been eliminated, and dozens of countries have started to apply tax 
transparency standards. This has enabled the EU to confront tax avoidance by individuals and 
corporations (see the statement of Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni).  
4.4 Recent EU initiatives 
The European Commission has recently been active on the AML front. In its recent Action Plan, it 
proposed 1) to turn certain parts of the AML directives into a regulation and 2) to consider creating an 
EU-wide body to deal with AML, to ensure better implementation and compliance with the rules. It also 
calls for 3) having a single rulebook, through delegated acts and addition of provisions in other rules to 
ensure consistency for AML purposes. On the 4) law enforcement side, it proposes a more formal 
network for FIU.net and a mechanism for information exchange across jurisdictions, while respecting 
data protection. In the 5) international sphere, it proposes that the EU speak with one voice in the FATF, 
for better protection of the EU’s financial interests. 
In a July 2019 communication, the Commission had already hinted at the creation of an EU-wide AML 
body. It also published a report on recent money laundering cases involving EU credit institutions, in 
response to an EU Council request, and a supranational risk assessment report with regard to 47 
products and services falling under 11 different sectors that are considered potentially vulnerable to 
money laundering/terrorist financing risks (see Table 5 at the end). The first report concluded that many 
of the banks examined pursued chancy business from an AML/CFT perspective, without establishing 
commensurate controls and risk management. The second report found that many products/services 
pose significant risk. Moreover, while coordination for the financial sector as per EU Commission 
recommendations is effective, this is not so for the non-financial sector, where the oversight framework 
is very patchy, covering tax advisors, auditors, external accountants, notaries, and other independent 
legal professionals and estate agents. The report adds that, to date, no member state has made any 
notification to the Commission concerning the first report  on the supra-national risk assessment of 
money laundering.   
Neither the Action Plan nor the 2019 communication make any mention of the ECB’s role for AML as 
prudential supervisor in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. If a single entity has to be created, the 
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easiest way is to do it within or close to the ECB, which has the expertise and the legal basis (although 
formally this is limited to prudential supervision and financial stability) and can act more independently 
vis-à-vis member states than can the EBA. Back in 2012, when discussion about further reform of 
banking supervision took place, the European Commission likewise did not consider giving the ECB a 
bigger role, leaving the matter aside until the member states decided otherwise and created the SSM. 
The EU Council gave a strong political mandate to the Commission to resume pursuit of structural 
change in oversight in its conclusions of 5 December 2019. It identified a range of shortcomings with 
respect to banks, AML authorities, prudential supervisors and intra-EU cooperation and concluded that 
there is fragmentation in both AML rules and supervision. The Council therefore called upon the 
Commission to address some AML deficiencies through a regulation and to analyse the pros and cons 
of an EU-wide body in this domain. It also underlined the need to strengthen the coordination work 
carried out by the EU Financial Intelligence Units Platform. This was reiterated in the conclusions of 5 
November 2020, with a clear endorsement for an EU supervisor. Before that, the EU Council had 
adopted its own AML action plan, which relied more upon the ESAs, and EBA in particular, called for 
cooperation between the different supervisors in the supervisory colleges and recommended 
integrating AML/CFT into the prudential supervisory process. The ministers asked for a "post-mortem" 
review of recent AML cases, in the wake of the Den Danske case in 2017-18, which involved about €200 
billion in suspect transactions channelled through the Estonian affiliate of the bank over the preceding 
decade.  
To add to momentum toward creating a unitary agency, six EU member states—the five largest and 
Latvia — called in a joint position paper for a European supervisory mechanism to prevent money 
laundering and terrorist financing. It foreshadowed the European Commission’s communication by 
advocating for a set of harmonised, directly applicable rules and a new layer of supervision, comprising 
of a dedicated central supervisor that controls the high-risk financial institutions, or alternatively a 
separate committee within EBA that builds on its new powers but is “exempted from the one country 
one-vote rationale and distinct from the current EBA governance for prudential supervision” (joint 
position paper, p. 4). This proposal is limited to the financial sector, but the hope is that it “can provide 
important input for ML/FT mechanisms in other sectors.” Other elements in supervision, such as FIUs 
and law enforcement, would remain at the national level.  
The European Parliament, for its part, in a July 2020 resolution welcomed the proposed changes to the 
EU AML institutional structure, based upon “its deep concern regarding the EBA’s ability to carry out an 
independent assessment owing to its governance structure”. The Parliament focused more on the tax 
dimension of AML and prescribed a “European framework for cross-border tax investigations and other 
cross-border financial crimes”. It criticised ‘golden visas’, asking member states to “phase out all existing 
citizenship by investment (CBI) or residency by investment (RBI) schemes as soon as possible”. 
4.5 Assessment 
Better implementation is the key to making AML policy work, but the concept of money laundering is 
elastic, and the regulatory and supervisory framework complex, as it stretches over different policy 
areas. The main problem lies with the member states, or with the mixture of pure single market and 
more intergovernmental competences at EU level to ensure proper interaction between the authorities 
involved. Yet even purely at the national level, this is not working effectively or efficiently, so how could 
an EU body work better, and what powers would it have? Given the Lisbon Treaty, they will need to be 
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limited to domains where the EU has clear authority, taking into consideration the ‘Meroni doctrine’, 
concerning the appropriateness of delegation of EU responsibilities to regulatory agencies. An EU entity 
would have difficulties in deciding on sanctions, or in having assets frozen, for example. This is where 
problems start. 
Looking at the policymaking process, the benefits of up-to-date AML policies are evident in higher 
revenues for the state, greater transparency and confidence in economic life, better public accounts, 
reduction of crime, increased public safety and health and, more broadly, the cohesion of civil society 
and legitimacy of states. However, as indicated earlier, the success of the policies adopted thus far is 
minimal, and the cost of compliance, for both public and private sectors, is growing. A recent estimate 
set compliance costs at €81.4 bn for four EU countries alone, with proportionally larger costs for bigger 
firms. The effectiveness and impact of policy intervention remains to be publicly explained, it has been 
argued (Pol, 2020). Hence, before considering further measures and an eventual European agency, a 
profound review of the approach taken so far is required. A far better understanding of underlying 
criminality is essential, together with rigorous benefit/cost analysis and regulatory impact analysis. 
Turning the directive, or parts of it, into a regulation may help resolve the inconsistencies in 
interpretation and practical application, though not entirely on its own. There is the ever-expanding 
concept of money laundering in EU law. A regulation will give the impression that all is set at EU level, 
but can still leave open important options for national implementation, hence undermining its impact, 
as is the case in the 2014 statutory audit regulation (EU 537/2014), for example. The regulation should 
advance a more proportional risk-based approach in AML, which is critical, rather than increasing box 
ticking and compliance costs for banks. This will require a thorough dialogue with the private sector on 
its formulation. 
More immediately important is ending the deadlock in how FIU.net is handled. The functioning of FIUs 
is the main current bottleneck in AML, and requires an urgent initiative to adapt them to the single 
market, to increase adoption of technology and benefit from all the concomitant advantages. FIU.net 
should operate a centralised platform that enables activity and behaviour patterns to be identified, and 
action to be taken.  
The initiatives of some member states to bring together the different entities involved in AML/CFT from 
the private and public sectors in a joint task force are worth emulating to allow for a more efficient EU-
wide approach. In the United Kingdom, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) 
established a public/private partnership, taking a holistic system approach against economic crime. This 
was followed by similar arrangements in The Netherlands (AMLC), Sweden and Denmark. At EU level, it 
led to the very recent creation of EFIPPP, Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership 
between FIUs and banks. 
AML policy is strongly related to unfinished single-market policies, such as corporate taxation and 
company law. In both these areas, there is strong resistance to synchronisation from the member states, 
and whatever certain states may want in terms of more effective AML policies is negated by the diversity 
of corporate tax regimes and facilities to create shell companies, and the limited or nonexistent 
transparency of UBOs. Moreover, corporate tax harmonisation requires unanimous decision among the 
member states. Progress on the Common Consolidated Tax Directive proposal would be a good step 
indicating that EU members are earnest about tackling money laundering. 
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In relation to the non-financial sector, there are no entities at EU level corresponding to the European 
Supervisory Authorities. For tax advisors, auditors, external accountants, notaries, independent legal 
professionals and estate agents, there are no European authorities, but mostly self-regulating entities 
based nationally with sometimes loose cooperation at the EU level.  
In the realm of law enforcement, cooperation has advanced a lot since the Lisbon Treaty was adopted. 
Important differences remain, however, as to what is considered tax crime for money laundering in the 
EU member states and which penalties should apply. There are countries with severe sentences for tax 
crime but lenient ones for money laundering and countries in which the reverse is true, as well as 
countries where both crimes are sentenced similarly (Unger, 2020). To make this work at the European 
level is extremely difficult, as seen in the case of implementation of the European Arrest Warrant. The 
establishment of the Office of the European Public Prosecutor (EPPO) will advance matters, but it will 
only deal with matters affecting the EU’s financial interest, at least to start with. 
5. Fault lines in anti-money laundering 
Money laundering has become a serious concern among financial institutions. Although action to 
combat it has been taking place for about 30 years, it is only more recently, and partly as a result of 
some high-profile cases, that it has become a top priority. AML should be part of basic risk management 
in all governments and all financial institutions, it should be reflected in the governance structure with 
integrated, proactive, aggressive and interoperable defences, as well as externally, in the supervisory 
structure. In practice, recent cases demonstrate that there are serious fault lines in compliance. 
5.1 Recent high-profile cases in AML 
European authorities have recently stepped up their actions against money laundering. The most well-
known cases recently involve Nordic banks, in dealings through entities in the Baltics with Russia. U.S. 
authorities have been active for a longer time, using a somewhat different focus, with an enormous fine 
levied against the French bank BNP Paribas in 2014, for example.  
The way banks respond to these cases differs significantly from organisation to organisation. It is only 
recently that public reaction has led to pressure on banks to become more proactive in publicising their 
AML policies. This may be a good step toward finding the right approach in policy-making, but not if it 
reveals an organisation’s defences to the criminal fraternity. At the same time, it should be noted that 
the public furore has focused on the banks’ role as gatekeepers, and the impact on underlying 
criminality has been almost entirely absent from media coverage. A sense of balance, cooperation 
between the various organisations fighting money laundering, be they public or private, needs to be 
restored. 
The most well-known recent case is undoubtedly Den Danske Bank, given the total amount that passed 
through the bank’s books, about €200 billion in transaction flows between 2007 and 2015. The scheme 
concerned the transactions of 15,000 non-resident clients originating from the Estonian branch of the 
bank, which was brought to light by a whistle-blower. This raised questions about the role of the Danish 
FSA and the functioning of the supervisory college of the bank in the Nordics. But the bank is the only 
one that disclosed total flows in relation to non-resident customers, and therefore difficult to compare 
with others. Other banks have, and only in some instances, published actual money laundering or 
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transactions that violated sanctions, numbers that are by their nature much smaller. The Chairman and 
CEO left the bank ultimately. 
In a report on the case, the Danish FSA proposed the following as remedies: 1) better and more effective 
lines of defence in banks; 2) duty to disclose and criminal liability, as well as improved protection of 
whistle-blowers; and 3) tougher consequences when bank management fails to live up to its 
responsibilities. As to the European dimension, the EBA board examined the case, but it concluded there 
was no breach of EU law by the Danish FSA in applying the AML directive and in not properly supervising 
the bank. EBA did so believing partly that an action against the regulator was not the correct instrument 
in a case that had happened five years earlier. This raised some concerns since the bank, and indirectly 
also the Danish FSA, reacted too little and too late in response to the whistle-blower’s complaint. The 
EU Commission did not accept the EBA’s decision but has not acted further thus far.  
The attention paid to the case, however, demonstrates the debate focuses on the symptoms rather 
than the causes. The criminal gangs concerned, and the impact of the money laundering scheme on 
society and commerce, have largely been absent from discussion. It does need to be recognised that 
banks and other obliged entities can only do so much against laundering operations as gatekeepers. 
Bank staff are not trained investigators or detectives, and they are not law enforcement; they perform 
a vital function for society in oiling the wheels of the global economy. In the early days of AML, law 
enforcement was better resourced and supported, politically, financially and technologically. It 
penetrated criminal gangs and followed the money trail. The banks provided evidence of the 
transactions necessary to convict. News of the busting of large criminal networks was made public.  
More recently governments’ strategy seems to have changed from one of requiring banks and other 
obliged entities to sift the electronic and other records for evidence of criminality, to being held to 
blame when money laundering operations are uncovered. This change in strategy is unhelpful. There is 
little or no impact on underlying criminality, save for encouraging its growth. The cost savings for 
governments in terms of reduction of the size of financial crime police units is more than outweighed 
by the massive increases in compliance costs for the financial sector, reducing access to financial 
markets for honest borrowers (witness the rise of alternative financing methods as a reaction to more 
cautious bank lending), and the economies of member states lose out in balance and in the long term. 
Banks have been forced to pay massive fines. Although transparency is seen as key in fighting criminal 
pursuits that lead to money laundering and corruption, there is no transparency offered by regulators 
or governments as to how the revenue generated by fines has been used. Curiously, all governments 
simultaneously claim there is no money available to support financial law enforcement. This strategy 
must change, not only to protect the populace against terrorist bombings, cybercriminals, drug 
overdoses and the like, but also to support action against environmental crimes, as well as for the sake 
of enhancing economic growth. 
The table below demonstrates the large differences among individual cases, and the responses by the 
banks, shareholders and the authorities. In some cases there are fines, in other cases settlements for 
undisclosed violations. In still other cases, decisions are yet awaited. This points again to the difficulty 
of having a streamlined, EU-wide (let alone global) approach, in the face of very different legal systems. 
The cases mentioned, but also others given less attention, have led to a sea change in AML risk 
management within the banks concerned, which is analysed in the following section. 
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Table 3. Recent high-profile cases in AML in the EU banking sector 
 Year Case Impact Fines Sources 
Swedbank 2020 Failure to apply AML 
procedures in Baltic 
subsidiaries on 
about €37 bn of 
transactions 
between 2014 and 
2019  
New CEO and 
management team 
€360 mn fine 
by Swedish 
FSA for failure 











No discharge of 
board members for 
2018 accounts. CFO 
steps down 
Settlement of 




ABLV (Latvia) 2018 Unclear: involved in 








led to lawsuits 





2018 Failure to apply AML 
procedures on about 
€200 bn in 
transactions through 
its non-resident 
accounts from 2007 
to 2015 in the 
Estonian branch  
CEO, chair and 
several managers 
and employees left 















Danish FSA and 





BNPParibas 2014 Transactions with 
countries blacklisted 
by United States 
US authorities 
required certain 











5.2 A confused AML risk management framework 
EU rules require credit institutions to have governance arrangements in place to ensure sound and 
effective risk management. Internal control mechanisms should prevent failures, such as money 
laundering, in the compliance framework. But the cases highlighted above, as well as others, point to 
huge deficiencies in putting these frameworks into place. This was analysed in a 2019 European 
Commission report. It sees weaknesses in the different lines of defence that a bank is recommended by 
regulators to have in place to counter money laundering. These lines of defence consist of: 
- The front office: recognising or reporting suspicious customers and types of transactions. 
- Risk management and compliance: ensuring that the front office, at all levels, is duly informed 
and clear procedures are in place. Units are properly staffed to respond and comply with the 
rules. They follow the procedure of submitting suspicious transaction reports to the local FIUs. 
Senior management is informed and acts in cases of failure. 
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- Internal risk audit: a unit that controls (1) and (2) independently from management, with a 
direct reporting line to the audit committee and executives. The internal audit should allow for 
the raising of a case by a whistle-blower, who should be protected in so doing. 
For large banking groups, which are thought to be the primary targets for money laundering, though no 
proper research has been conducted on this, the challenge is to have these policies consistently applied 
at corporate level, in the EU and third countries, in branches and subsidiaries, and in correspondent 
banking relationships. The variety of organisational models of banks, the degree of integration of control 
systems in often merged cross-border entities, and diverse administrative requirements and languages 
makes this problematic for compliance departments to monitor. Indeed, large banks are often 
collections of smaller entities that have been bought out or merged, with little attempt to create a truly 
single identity or culture, and often with a plethora of legacy systems. To improve the organisational 
strength of such entities, regulators need to be more assiduous in ensuring there is a plan, resources 
and the will to consummate bank mergers so that they can operate more efficiently and protect 
themselves better against financial crime. Sadly, this need is usually overlooked. Such policies often 
clash with commercial and customer onboarding objectives, or create conflict among bank staff. In the 
case of Den Danske Bank, for example, the laundering happened at the Estonian branch, where 
employees actively covered up violations, which were insufficiently held in check by headquarters. The 
information technology system of the branch was not integrated with the rest of the group. The branch 
fell under the watch of the Danish FSA for prudential matters, but under the Estonian authorities for 
AML. It seems that the lessons from earlier egregious collapses resulting from unrestrained nefarious 
and speculative activity, the BCCI and Barings Bank cases of the 1990s, were forgotten.  
- Auditors: An external audit must ensure that accounts reflect a fair and proper view of the 
company. Auditors need to check that internal controls are taking place, i.e. that the KYC rules 
are applied, and that the business is a going concern. Irregularities need to be reported to the 
authorities. The complexities described above, with different legal frameworks and responsible 
authorities, render the task of auditors more difficult. EU law harmonised the conditions for 
statutory audit (regulation EU 537/2014) but left many options to the member states, such as 
for the provision of non-audit services by auditors. The regulation created a thin structure for 
EU-wide cooperation, the Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB), which is 
managed by the European Commission. This confusing picture has received scant attention, but 
further harmonisation will be required to help prevent more cases of money laundering. 
At the next stage, there is the role of the government authorities: the supervisory and law enforcement 
authorities, and the FIUs and tax authorities. 
- Prudential and conduct supervisory authorities: AML supervision is a task for prudential 
authorities in most member states, as it is part of the core risk management tasks of a financial 
institution. Moreover, it can have financial stability implications. Some countries have a specially 
dedicated entity. The newly formed EBA AML Standing Committee brings together these 
different bodies, 57 in total, including those of the EEA countries (see Table 6 at the end). 
- The FIUs process suspicious transaction and suspicious activity reports, as well as cash 
transaction reports in certain countries, and pass these on to law enforcement for action. 
- Tax authorities can act to pursue tax evasion and counter tax avoidance. 
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- Law enforcement authorities are charged with assimilating the intelligence, assembling 
evidence and prosecuting cases. 
Each of these lines is organised differently across the EU, let alone in the rest of the world, which makes 
consistent application of AML/CFT challenging. Cross-border cases demand strong cooperation among 
these entities, which is time-consuming, but no AML supervisor appears until recently in charge of 
supervising groups (although it is explicitly mentioned in the Fourth AML Directive, and now the task of 
EBA). Certain international networks, such as the Egmont Group and Moneyval, have come to support 
these needs to some degree, but this has yet to translate into any significant impact on underlying 
criminality. 
The European Commission detected unease among prudential supervision authorities in using their far-
reaching powers against money laundering, “as the prudential framework only exceptionally refers 
explicitly to such concerns” (EC 2019 report, p. 11). The Single Supervisory Mechanism is seen as an 
additional layer for coordination, but not considered an AML/CFT authority, according to recital 28 of 
the SSM regulation. The first head of the SSM executive board, Danielle Nouy, often reiterated that 
AML/CFT supervision is not the SSM’s business.  
An additional problem is that home-country control, the basis of prudential supervision in the EU, does 
not apply in relation to AML, where the host country is in charge, as was clear in the Den Danske Bank 
case. AML issues were not consistently factored into the review of the credit institutions’ prudential 
framework, it appears, while they may have far-reaching consequences. This also applies at corporate 
headquarters, where AML/CFT issues are not prominent, according to the EU Commission’s 2019 
report. The differences in the supervisory architecture for prudential and AML purposes renders 
cooperation more difficult. The same applies with regard to law enforcement authorities. Hence, the 
EU is faced with an AML governance spaghetti, in the context of growing cross-border activity and more 
centralised prudential supervision.  
Concerning enforcement, judicial systems and penalties differ widely in the EU, a situation that will not 
change soon since member states zealously guard these powers.  
5.3 New technologies and AML 
Over the past five to ten years there has been a drive to create uniformity in vendor systems utilised by 
the financial sector, with consistent standards, scenario planning and functions. In the same period, 
there have also been significant developments through enhanced computer power and artificial 
intelligence, use of blockchain and other technologies, which create opportunities to streamline analysis 
and reporting, and target risk resources, moving away from traditional, rules-based monitoring to 
identifying behaviours, network analysis and clustering of risk attributes. As such, there is opportunity 
for EU financial institutions and non-financial firms to enhance their surveillance mechanisms and focus 
on effectiveness.  
In certain respects, technology has improved both the identification of financial crime and delivery of 
more actionable information.4 Data collection and analytical tools have become more powerful, and 
technology is advancing. The application of blockchain technology to transactions, for example, could 
allow for better control of them.  There is a need for progress across three key dimensions, however: 
 
4 This section is based upon a contribution of HSBC to the task force and on the response of a task force member. 
ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE EU | 25 
 
- Data: The issue is not so much the lack of data (certain databases for use in AML are in bad shape, 
however) but whether the right data are collected, their quality, the processing power and 
analytical capability, in order to assess it and use it more effectively. There is a need for more in-
depth and relevant data that can be updated dynamically.   
- Analytics: With better data, AI and machine learning could be used to develop better models of 
analysis that allow the carrying out of more complete risk assessments. This will have to be an 
iterative process, rolling out the best analytical models that provide a view spanning a number of 
different risks and combining and aggregating data across all sectors and regions. There are many 
data analysis techniques, though, and the end result will only be as good as the algorithm 
concerned. 
- Communication: The crux of the matter is understanding how to get the right information in a 
timely manner to the appropriate people to get the correct decision, including providing insight, 
data and intelligence to law enforcement. That would require an operating model and a framework 
that are more agile and complex than the ones in use today. 
One of the problems with technology is that once a good system is up and running, it may hinder 
effectiveness or reduce the attractiveness of developing further advanced technology to manage 
financial crime risks. New technologies may, for example, result in a reduction in the number of SARs 
being filed, appearing to present a decline in potential suspicious activity and raw data that will need to 
be explained to the authorities. AI systems could effectively lock large numbers of innocent people out 
of financial markets if not implemented and executed correctly. It could also act as a brake on 
innovation, not just of financial products but of law enforcement and supervision techniques. 
In the future, transaction monitoring could be integrated into dynamic risk assessment and could use 
new, more effective and faster technology as support tools for decision-making. This dynamic risk 
assessment may be based on four pillars, as outlined below. Analysis via each of them will result in a 
probability of ‘suspicious’ activity taking place. At the heart of the issue, however, is that suspicion is a 
human concept, and it is very difficult to teach a computer to be suspicious, as opposed to highlighting 
unusual transactions in relation to set parameters. Human intelligence must not be left out of any AML 
assessment system, following four pillars: 
- Subject matter expertise: Considers what is already known about suspicious activities. 
- Outlier detection: Considers behaviours that are different in comparison with the average profile 
for a specific segment of customers. 
- Anomaly detection: Looks at sudden changes in the behaviour of customers over time. 
- Network analysis: Shows linkages and interconnectivity between different players in the system. 
A policy environment is needed that supports these technologies. That includes better regulation, 
particularly on AI, and knowledge sharing that encourages innovative thinking and response. It should 
facilitate the detection of suspicious transactions and new fraud patterns across regions, instruments 
and techniques. More cooperation within the private sector is therefore needed, as much as is possible, 
and between the public and private sectors, within the limits of national constitutions, the EU Treaty 
provisions and the respect of fundamental rights. 
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Box 1. Transaction Monitoring Netherlands 
Five Dutch banks (ABN AMRO, ING, Rabobank, Triodos Bank and de Volksbank) have decided to 
establish Transaction Monitoring Netherlands (TMNL) in the collective fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism. The TMNL initiative will be an addition to the banks’ 
individual transaction monitoring activities. TMNL will focus on identifying unusual patterns in 
payments traffic that individual banks cannot identify. The five banks have studied whether 
collective transaction monitoring is technically and legally feasible under the aegis of the Dutch 
Banking Association, as well as the question whether TMNL can add material value in the fight 
against money laundering. Research showed that collective transaction monitoring will allow for 
better and more effective detection of criminal money flows and networks in addition to what 
banks can achieve individually with their own transaction data. It also showed that combining 
transaction data will provide new (inter-bank) information that will be useful in the fight against 
financial crime. In addition to the banks fulfilling their own responsibility as gatekeepers, effectively 
dealing with money laundering and the financing of terrorism requires a national (linkage to official 
agencies and others) approach. The banks are therefore working closely with government partners 
such as the ministries of finance, justice and security, the Fiscal Information and Intelligence 
Service (FIOD), the financial intelligence unit (FIU) and the police. The aim is to collectively 
significantly increase the return from identification to detection, prosecution and conviction of 
criminality. 
 
There has been progress through joint private-sector initiatives, such as Transaction Monitoring 
Netherlands (see box above). In public/private partnerships (PPPs), there are the Joint Money 
Laundering Intelligence Task Force (JMLIT) in the United Kingdom, the Swedish Anti-Money Laundering 
Intelligence Initiative (SAMLIT), and other initiatives in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands (AMLC), 
as well as evolving work by Europol to direct financial institutions to identify and provide information 
that is of use to law enforcement. The same has happened in the United States, with the recent 
announcement by the U.S. FIU Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) that it will examine AML 
effectiveness and outcomes, in order to refocus on higher-value AML activities. It aims to increase 
information sharing and public/private partnerships and to leverage new technologies and risk 
management techniques—and thus increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. AML regime. 
These initiatives can be expected to continue to develop, along with (i) automated reporting to support 
the FIU’s own data investigation and (ii) efforts to cut down on resource-intensive manual processes 
that do not generate meaningful results or actionable intelligence.  
A firm is able effectively to manage and identify client or external entity risk and exposure on a local, 
regional and global scale. Areas of emphasis should include flexibility on the application of non-risk-
driven uniform processes such as collection of adverse media and politically exposed persons (PEP) data 
and use of transaction monitoring in businesses or client types. This flexibility may enable private-sector 
bodies to focus their resources on areas of priority for the public sector.  
However, information shared within PPPs requires appropriate legal protection, and respecting a clear 
division of competences between private and public sectors. A well-defined safe harbour should be 
provided for institutions when disclosing information in a controlled manner and for the broader public 
interest of preventing financial crime. The private sector has no guarantee or legal certainty that they 
will be exonerated of liability in cases where national and EU law have been violated. This is where bank 
secrecy, GDPR and EU competition policy considerations come into play. For the last of these three, 
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exchange of data is allowed if it contributes to the public good and if it is confined to the stated purpose, 
but a framework is needed to guard against collusion, which can bolster the larger players in the field. 
It can also raise conflict of interest and governance issues. 
Ethical considerations should also be taken into account. To retain the trust of the customer, there is a 
need to be transparent, address bias and explain publicly what is to be done. Care needs to be taken so 
as not to stifle innovation, to avoid instilling anti-competitive behaviours, to eschew creating market 
access barriers or encouraging financial exclusion. In this context, the work of the European Commission 
High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence needs to be advanced. Authorities also must recognise 
that criminal organisations are developing their own AI, to improve their own money laundering 
techniques, and that needs to be monitored and countered. 
6. Pillar 2 Risk Management 
6.1 Measure what matters 
Not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts. This area of 
European policy development stands out for the lack of underlying data which ordinarily would be 
collected, collated and analysed in order to identify policy options and then select the best ones. A lot 
of the reason for this is the nature of the area itself and the activities carried out. Criminals do not report 
on their activities, and it is hard for governments and policy makers to establish what a true picture is. 
That being said, there is room for development of ‘dark number’ theory in order to gain a better 
understanding of what is happening.  
There are many reports on money laundering and measures taken to stop it, ranging from FIUs, 
regulators and consultancies, but there is little co-ordination between them. The taxonomy of financial 
crime thus needs some attention to improve commonality so that all those concerned in fighting 
financial crime know that they are talking about the same thing. 
If anti money laundering is to improve, both measures of effectiveness, and measures of efficiency are 
needed. Our initial research leads us to the conclusion that the adoption of objectives and key results 
as measures of effectiveness, and adoption of KPIs as measures of efficiency would be extremely useful. 
The use of OKRs is a relatively new development in industry. It has been used to considerable effect in 
the development of leading technology companies in particular.  
The original objectives of anti-money laundering were to reduce the incidence of the underlying harms, 
specifically those caused by trafficking in illegal drugs. It was postulated that by removing the possibility 
of retaining the proceeds of drug crime the criminals would do something else which benefitted the 
normal economy. The current objectives of the AML regime are unclear, but appear to involve one or 
more of the following, depending on the standpoint of those concerned: 
- Implement FATF Recommendations 
- Be seen to implement FATF recommendations 
- Implement EU directives 
- Be seen to implement EU directives 
- Pass an FATF inspection 
- Pass a regulatory inspection 
- Reduce false positives 
28 | CEPS-ECRI TASK FORCE REPORT 
 
Objectives are vital as if you do not know where you are going, you are already there, and will never 
make any progress. Objectives set out what is to be achieved. They need to be significant, concrete, 
involve action and be inspirational. Key Results act as benchmarks. They monitor how we get to our 
objectives. They need to be specific, time bound, aggressive yet realistic. 
So what kinds of objectives and key results (OKRs) could be considered in terms of progressing AML 
effectiveness around Europe? If we were to address the AML Governance Objective, then a way forward 
may be along the following lines: 
- Objective: Remove the fault lines across Europe 
o KR1: Create a single EU AML body 
o KR2: Agree on a multilateral MoU between law enforcement and FIUs 
o KR3: Establish PPP (Public Private Partnership) in relation to information to be shared 
between the public and private sector (building upon the work in several Member 
States to establish Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Teams) 
If we were to address the AML Risk Management Objective, then a way forward may be along the 
following lines: 
- Objective: Meaningful Risk-Based Approach 
o KR1: Measurements and KPIs developed on predicate offences 
o KR2: Annual Member State evaluation system 
o KR3: FATF review to EU implementation in 24 months maximum 
If we were to address the AML Capability Objective, then a way forward may be along the following lines: 
- Objective: Establish effective law enforcement capability 
o KR1: Commitment to minimum inalienable budgets 
o KR2: Training of law enforcement in financial markets and financial crime 
o KR3: EU level training standards for whole of enforcement process 
It appears that the financial sector by and large has adopted few KPIs. When asking Money Laundering 
Reporting Officers (MLROs) across the financial sector as to what KPIs they use in assessing the efficiency 
of their AML processes, the usual response has been the number of Suspicious Activity Reports that 
have been filed. Some mention their training states, so the numbers of staff who have undertaken 
training, how often the training has been carried out, and in certain cases which staff have passed a 
test. These are measures which are easy to record, but when asked further as to how these measures 
improve AML, or have an impact on underlying predicate criminality, there is little clarity. We would 
therefore suggest the adoption of KPIs to improve efficiency of processes within financial institutions. 
This requires more imagination. Some financial institutions take the following measurements, for 
example: 
- General MI (Management Information) 
- Risk tolerance breach retain decisions  
- New applications declined  
- Customer risk rating classifications  
- Business wide risk assessment status  
It would help to tie such KPIs into the KPIs used by the business as a whole, such as the speed of opening 
new accounts, or the speed of making secure payments. Yet such KPIs as are adopted need to be tied 
into the OKRs that have been set. There is no point setting a KPI if it merely serves to keep a bad process. 
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6.2 Risk-based approach 
In order to reduce compliance burdens and increase effectiveness, the concept of risk-based deterrence 
has been introduced. Although highly attractive conceptually, the risk-based system has been stymied 
since it has become the regulator who decides what the risk is, rather than allowing firms to carry out 
their own risk function, with regulators checking that the risk process works and the firm developing its 
risk assessment skills. This initiative needs to become less dirigiste to succeed. 
6.2.1 Derisking 
Many financial institutions are attempting to de-risk in order to cut down the risk of regulatory action 
and fines. Some of this action appears to be quite blunt, in refusing to carry accounts which relate to 
business allegedly carried out in certain countries, or certain types of customer. This can result in severe 
difficulties for certain communities. That part of the financial sector relating to the accounts of money 
remittance companies held by large banks is a case in point. A further issue is that forcing certain types 
of customers, or certain types of transaction, out of the financial sector merely serves to drive such 
business underground and therefore makes such business (which may include criminal monies as well 
as legitimate funds) less transparent and more difficult for law enforcement to observe.  
6.2.2 Balance 
Balance is a key element to remember. There is no point placing so great a compliance burden on your 
economy that you drive out good money as well as bad, plummet in the Global Financial Centres Index 
and drive your economic success to other rival centres. Similarly, there is a need to achieve balance 
within a financial institution. As compliance burdens increase, profitability reduces and the customer is 
not served, nor will economic growth be as high as it could be.   
6.2.3 Competition and financial inclusion 
The nexus between AML and competition needs to be given close attention as certain events are not 
working as they should. An example of this is in the payments sector, and more specifically in relation 
to money remittance. Many countries have migrant workers who come to Europe to earn better salaries 
than in their home countries. Understandably, they wish to send home some of their earnings to help 
their families in the countries which they have come from. These are often in small amounts, of just 
€100 or so. Paying a transfer fee charged by a traditional financial institution in the region of €25 is 
clearly uneconomic, so remittance companies have been established which collect monies and transfer 
in bulk to the destination country where the amount is unbundled and remitted to the local accounts 
of the family. In this scenario the transferors are paying far less than €25. However, the transfers across 
border still have to go through the traditional banking system, and certain such banks have been closing 
the accounts of the remittance companies, citing dissatisfaction with the AML procedures of the 
remittance companies, but the real reason is believed to be competition. In many cases the AML 
procedures of the remittance companies have been stronger than those of the banks. 
AML procedures in certain financial institutions have become so cumbersome that individuals which do 
not satisfy certain “blue tape” requirements end up being shut out of the financial system altogether, 
despite the fact that the monies they wish to pass through the system being entirely legitimate. 
Competition authorities and regulators need to keep an eye on this as otherwise such individuals will 
start to use underground banking systems, which will not be in the interests of the financial sector or 
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the economy as a whole. A further aspect of competition is the differentiation in implementation of 
AML laws between states, giving rise to regulatory arbitrage. 
6.2.4 Defence system strategy 
In assessing how deterrence should work, many regulators and companies have latched on to a principle 
of three lines of defence. This follows the old military principle of castle building, the outer wall 
representing the first line of defence, the inner wall the second line of defence, and the keep the final 
line. This concept of defence as applied to financial institutions and corporations has the customer 
facing business staff as the front line (the organisation’s outer wall), the legal and compliance functions 
as the second line (the organisation’s inner wall) and senior management and audit as the third and 
final line (the organisation’s castle keep). But this concept is outmoded, ineffective and encourages the 
wrong mentality in crime fighting. It is a static model, it is reactive, and it encourages a defensive soon-
to-be-victim siege mentality. Better is a system of integrated active defence, where all anti-money 
laundering assets are designed to work together, an application to the financial sector of a concept 
currently used by the world’s militaries to great effect in defences such as Integrated Air Defence 
Systems and Integrated Carrier Battle Groups. 
6.2.5 Whistleblowing and security of reporting and reports 
There is increasing legal protection of those blowing the whistle on illegal practices, though this is not 
without its flaws. There continue to be cases of whistleblowers, far from being given protection, being 
actively harassed and prejudiced against. Those receiving such sensitive information should work to 
create an alternative credible source for the disclosed information, enable independent anonymous 
disclosure and protect sources. If protection cannot be assured, this valuable intelligence source will be 
lost and the AML system will suffer as a result. In this context, it should also be recognised that those 
making suspicious activity reports or suspicious transaction reports are also whistleblowers and should 
be given protection.  
7. Pillar 3 Capability 
7.1 Training 
Training of law enforcement in how financial markets work is generally below what it could be. Virtually 
all law enforcement officers are given some financial investigation training, but this is not the same as 
instruction in the operation of financial markets such that law enforcement has a chance of recognising 
egregious behaviour, apprehending the perpetrators and obtaining necessary evidence. Some kind of 
specialist financial police are needed, properly trained and supported, in all countries. Commitment 
currently ranges from Financial Investigation Units consisting of just one law enforcement officer, to 
specialist financial police like the Guardia di Finanza with a force of around 70,000 persons. 
It is not just amounts and types of training, but the way in which it is carried out which is important. 
Training using accelerated learning techniques has been shown to be much more effective than 
standard techniques. Recent Europol training has included gamification techniques, which are a further 
step forward and should be taken up by others involved too. The SIRIUS game, developed between 
Europol’s SIRIUS Project and the Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and 
Organised Crime Research (CENTRIC) has been developed for investigators to gain practical experience 
in requesting data from online service providers, such as internet providers and social media platforms. 
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7.2 Funding 
Proper funding for supervisory and investigation authorities is of utmost importance. Money laundering 
is estimated to cost the global economy between $800 billion and $2 trillion annually, according to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report 2020. This amounts to 2%–5% of the global gross 
domestic product.  
Also compliance has a huge cost. The True Cost of Financial Crime Compliance Global Report, released 
in April 2020 by LexisNexis, estimated that the annual cost of financial crime compliance worldwide is 
around $181 bn, in Europe being $137 billion, followed by North America ($32 billion), Asia Pacific ($6 
billion), Latin America ($5 billion), and South Africa ($2 billion). These estimates were determined by 
polling 898 financial crime compliance decision makers, compiling an average spending amount for 
large, medium and small institutions in a particular market, then multiplying the average by the number 
of such firms in a given market. The most expensive countries for financial crime compliance are the 
United Kingdom ($50 billion) and Germany ($48 billion), followed by the United States ($26 billion), 
France ($21 billion), Italy ($16 billion), and Canada ($5 billion).  
Law enforcement costs are considerable too, but such figures are very hard to come by and very hard 
to compare due to differences in responsibilities and structures between countries. Nonetheless, 
certain key figures suggest a need for a proper investigation as to FIU and law enforcement 
effectiveness. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation was funded to $9,952.9 million in 2020, 
comprising 35,534 positions, 244 lawyers and 13,213 agents (source US Department of Justice). The 
budgetary request for FINCEN, the US FIU, for 2020 amounted to $124.7 million and 359 full time staff 
(source US Treasury). For 2020, the Europol’s Management Board approved an estimate of €174.8 
million as budgetary funds and an additional 66 Temporary Agents (TA) next to a steady level of 235 
Contract Agents (CA). Compared to this, following the proposal of the European Commission, the 
budgetary authority granted an EU contribution of €154.1 million and 24 TAs in 2020. In view of the 
forthcoming Europol Regulation recast, a boost of resources of Europol to implement the enhanced 
mandate and continuously increasing demand in the forthcoming Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) 2021-2027 would be required. It is difficult to see how AML effectiveness around Europe ban be 
increased without increases in personnel. Such numbers are tiny in comparison to both the level of fines 
imposed across Europe and in terms of the amounts spent by European financial institutions on AML 
compliance. 
7.3 Digitalisation 
AML compliance has become an end in itself, far more bureaucratic than it used to be, with the real 
objectives having become lost in a mass of organisational data kleptomania. Digitalisation of business 
has given rise to a search for an automated AML nirvana, reducing human input to a bare minimum. Yet 
money laundering deterrence is a human issue and programming errors can increase costs dramatically, 
as battles to reduce false positives have shown. The crux of AML is the suspicion of transactions or 
activity being derived from criminal actions. It is very difficult to teach a computer to be suspicious. True, 
computers can be a very useful support tool, and can be very helpful in identification of unusual 
transactions (which may or may not turn out to be suspicious or criminal in nature or provenance), but 
using them as decision tools can have unfortunate side effects. For example, most, if not all computer 
systems designed to identify suspicious transactions produce a very high number of “false positives”. 
The rate of false positives is often around 95-98%. These false positives have to be checked by human 
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investigation to see whether they are in fact ones which the financial institution should be concerned 
about and report. For some financial institutions, this entails 5,000 staff or more engaged purely on this 
task. This is a largely mindless, demotivating task for which the human brain is not designed. To give a 
sense of perspective, 5,000 staff is more than four times the size of the staff of Europol, and more than 
four times the size of the staff of the City of London Police, the police force which takes the lead on 
financial crime in the UK. This staffing figure represents just one financial institution. Few of those 
financial institution staff are trained investigators. It is difficult to see the benefit of this to the overall 
effort to defeat money laundering and its underlying predicate offences across Europe. This part of the 
system appears broken. 
7.4 Digital identity 
Digital identity of legal persons is an area which has seen some progress. Whereas all jurisdictions have 
a unique identifying number for each entity, which stays with them despite name changes, there was 
no unique identifier globally. The LEI initiative is in the process of trying to resolve this, and now has 
around 1.7 million entities using a unique global number. Across the EU, as a percentage, the LEI 
registration numbers range from 2% up to 8.9% of nationally registered companies in the UK. 
Digital identity of individuals is a goal pursued by a number of companies, without a solution at present. 
Each initiative looks at storing various biometrics, but all systems at present suffer from lack of coverage, 
recognition, and reliability. There are also questions over individual privacy, data protection, inclusion 
and cybersecurity.  
7.5 Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
There is much discussion about the use of AI in supporting anti money laundering as data volumes and 
transaction complexities grow. This does show promise as a decision support tool. Yet this is also an 
area clouded in mystique. There is fundamental confusion about what exactly AI is. A recent survey by 
IBM highlighted that around 50% of projects described as AI projects in fact had no discernible AI 
element to them at all. Again, taxonomy is important. We take the definition here of AI as expounded 
by the European Commission High Level Experts Group on AI (broken down into the various elements): 
“Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also hardware) systems, designed by 
humans that, given a complex goal, act in the physical or digital dimension, by perceiving their 
environment through data acquisition. These systems interpret the collected structured or unstructured 
data, act on the knowledge, or process the information, derived from this data and design a path and 
the best action(s) to take to achieve the given goal. AI systems can either use symbolic rules or learn a 
numeric model, and they can also adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is affected 
by their previous actions.”  
As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, such as:  
- Machine learning (of which deep learning and reinforcement learning are specific examples),  
- Machine reasoning (which includes planning, scheduling, knowledge representation and 
reasoning, search, and optimisation), and  
- Robotics (which includes control, perception, sensors and actuators, as well as the integration 
of all other techniques into cyber-physical systems).  
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There are many companies selling newly created “AI” systems intended to assist in the fight against 
money laundering and financial crime. The foundation for all of these systems is the algorithm which 
has been put together for the system. These algorithms are kept secret as they are the basis of 
profitability of the system. However, as there is so little transparency over the algorithms, there is a 
growing concern as to their trustworthiness. Fundamental legal tenets demand knowledge as to how 
decisions have been reached which affect individuals and corporations, as well as evidence.   
The European Commission High Level Experts Group on AI has produced some Ethics Guidelines for 
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. There are three key principles. AI systems must be: 
1. Lawful - respecting all applicable laws and regulations, 
2. Ethical - respecting ethical principles and values, 
3. Robust - both from a technical perspective while taking into account its social environment. 
These are sound principles from which to start, though naturally open to differing interpretations. 
Accordingly, the European Commission High Level Experts Group on AI has worked towards setting out 
certain requirements of AI systems. There are seven requirements: 
1. Human agency and oversight  
2. Technical robustness and safety 
3. Privacy and data governance 
4. Transparency 
5. Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness 
6. Societal and environmental wellbeing 
7. Accountability 
What is meant by these requirements is set out in some detail by the European Commission High Level 
Experts Group on AI. It must be pointed out that the Group on AI has to date not received much input 
from the financial sector, or from law enforcement in relation to development of these principles, nor 
as to their interpretation and application in the context of anti-money laundering. This is clearly a 
concern which will need to be addressed. In the meantime, there is growing evidence of use of AI 
systems by the criminal fraternity in the following areas: 
- Deep fakes: these are methods of creating images, video and audio which are very close to 
reality, designed to commit crimes 
- Forging documents 
- Automating exploitation of stolen data 
- Opening bank accounts 
- Overcoming supposition 
- Trafficking via AI planning and navigation, by the use of drones, etc. 
- Chatbot cybercrime: examples to date include chatbots encouraging Facebook users to 
download malware 
- Phishing and whaling: AI systems learning your system in order to exploit it 
- Creating malware: there is growing concern over ‘undetectable malware’, password scrappers, etc. 
- Cracking passwords: neural networks being established in order to predict passwords and break 
into systems 
Thus AI has become something of an arms race between the normal economy and the criminal 
fraternity. Passwords are set up to try and stop unauthorised access to systems. Criminal AI then 
attempts to guess and get through those password protections or scrap them altogether. Captcha 
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systems are established to try and block automated access. Criminal AI then attempts to guess the 
captchas. “Real traffic” systems are established to try and differentiate between normal activity and 
criminal activity. Criminal AI then monitors real traffic to make its attempts at penetration more likely 
of success. 
The AI systems being developed by police forces are not without contention either. Systems used for 
predictive policing, facial recognition, individual risk assessment and case management, etc., are not 
centralised, there is little public information available about them, the responsibilities are unclear, and 
there is little transparency. It is unsurprising that questions have been raised as to their legality. Here, 
adoption of the principles and requirements of the European Commission High Level Experts Group on 
AI will be needed to assist in growing trust between the public and private sectors. 
7.6 Tools for the alignment of models 
Compliance is often seen as all cost with little or no benefit. CEOs invest a lot in ensuring that their 
business models and compliance functions are properly aligned, effective and efficient. However, it is 
like fighting the windmills, as new cases may loom around the corner, bringing a bank’s management at 
risk. Some tools can be used to align the different models. 
7.6.1 Databases and Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Registers 
Progress on improving corporate databases is slow. Standard corporate databases and the information 
contained in them vary wildly across Europe. Some are quite comprehensive in holding information on 
directors, shareholders, company accounts, company charges. Others have no publicly accessible data 
on shareholders, and many have no information on the financial condition of companies, or information 
which is out of date. In some Member States information stored has decreased in value with loosening 
of requirements on personal address information, on shareholders and their shareholdings, on dates of 
birth, all of which make due diligence harder rather than easier. Accessibility and searchability is also an 
issue, with some databases being free to search, others paid for. Searchability differs between Member 
States too. It seems curious that steps are being advocated to include ultimate beneficial owners when 
data quality of even the basic register is often poor. Virtually all such databases are compiled from data 
submitted by those companies listed, with often no checks as to veracity being carried out by the 
registry itself. Data filing requirements also differ between incorporation formats such as companies, 
partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. In some states there can be in 
excess of twenty different forms of incorporation. 
Implementation of this requirement to identify ultimate beneficial owners has been slow and patchy 
across Europe. Only six Member States implemented by the deadline date. Some Member States have 
failed to implement the registers at all. Others have put the registers behind a paywall (eight Member 
States, expected to rise to 10). Two have prevented public searching unless the searcher already knows 
the tax identification number of the ultimate beneficial owner. Five Member States require searchers 
to register themselves first before searching. 
7.6.2 Outreach 
More support of, and liaison with the media is needed. The media is swift to pick up on fines levied 
against financial institutions, but not so great at picking up incidents of effective law enforcement 
action. As an example of this, Operation DisrupTor is a very recent joint action carried out by a coalition 
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of law enforcement agencies across the world supported by Europol and the FBI against criminal actors. 
Although there was mention of the enforcement action taken, there was no mention of the financial 
aspects and how the money laundering had been structured. For AML to improve in its effectiveness, 
publicity is required, as well as feedback to the financial sector. Sensitive operational data clearly should 
not be revealed, but strategic feedback to the financial sector is most useful in terms of maintenance of 
the morale of those reporting, as well as their awareness and education. 
7.6.3 Peer pressure  
The FATF has identified 11 key goals that an effective AML/CFT framework should achieve. These key 
goals or ‘immediate outcomes’ are organised by theme. During its mutual evaluations, the FATF 
assesses the effectiveness of a country’s efforts against each of these 11 immediate outcomes. Each 
country must enforce the 11 immediate outcomes, and ensure that the operational, law enforcement 
and legal components of an AML/CFT system work together and effectively to deliver results.  
Table 4. Rating of FATF Immediate Outcomes 
Country Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Austria Nov/18 ME SE ME ME ME LE LE ME SE ME SE 
Belgium Sep/18 SE SE ME ME ME SE ME ME SE ME ME 
Bulgaria             
Croatia             
Cyprus Dec/19 SE SE ME ME ME ME ME ME SE ME ME 
Czech Republic Sep/20 ME SE ME ME ME ME ME SE SE ME ME 
Denmark Nov/19 ME SE LE LE ME ME ME ME SE ME SE 
Estonia             
Finland Apr/19 SE HE LE ME ME SE SE ME ME ME ME 
France             
Germany             
Greece Sep/19 SE SE ME ME ME SE ME ME SE ME SE 
Hungary Dec/19 LE SE ME ME LE SE LE LE ME ME ME 
Ireland Nov/19 SE SE SE ME ME SE ME ME ME ME SE 
Italy Mar/19 SE SE ME ME SE SE SE SE SE ME SE 
Latvia Dec/19 ME SE ME ME LE ME ME ME ME ME LE 
Lithuania Sep/20 ME SE ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME 
Luxembourg             
Malta Jul/19 ME SE LE ME ME ME LE LE ME ME SE 
Netherlands             
Poland             
Portugal Dec/17 SE SE ME ME ME ME SE ME SE SE SE 
Romania              
Slovakia  Sep/20 ME SE ME ME ME ME ME LE ME ME ME 
Slovenia Dec/18 ME SE ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME 
Spain Dec/19 SE SE SE SE SE HE SE SE SE ME SE 
Sweden Sep/20 ME HE ME ME ME ME SE SE SE ME SE 
UK Dec/18 HE SE ME ME SE ME SE SE HE HE HE 
HE:  High Level of Effectiveness. Minor improvements needed (7) 
SE:  Substantial Level of Effectiveness. Moderate improvements needed (75) 
ME:  Moderate Level of Effectiveness. Major improvements needed (113) 
LE:  Low Level of Effectiveness. Fundamental improvements needed (14) 
Source: FATF Website as updated to 23 Dec 2020, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf. 
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Table 4 gives an overview of the rating of the FATF immediate outcomes for the EU. Nine of the EU 
Member States are not scored. Of the 19 that were, there would be 209 measures, and the number of 
these per level is included in brackets below the Table 4. Naturally, the position in certain member states 
may be better than indicated as only four member states have been assessed in 2020 so far, and there 
may have been improvement in the intervening period. However, it is noticeable that of the 209 scores, 
only 7 are judged to be of a high level of effectiveness. Some 61% of outcomes across the EU are thought 
to require major or fundamental improvements. 
8. The way forward: a step-by-step approach 
At the regulatory level: 
1. Have a proper impact assessment of the effectiveness of the AML directives and the measures that 
have thus far been introduced by the member states; 
2. Turn (parts of) the directive into a regulation. This is no panacea. It requires careful drafting and a 
well-managed decision-making process. Ensure alignment of EU rules with international standards;  
3. Ensure whistle-blower protection. The EU adopted a directive in 2019, which has to be implemented 
by 2021; 
4. Create common templates for reporting (STRs and SARs) to FIUs; 
5. Mandate disclosure and feedback on reports filed; 
6. Conclude a European pact effectively to combat tax fraud, avoidance and evasion and money 
laundering. This is one of the main proposals of a recent European Economic and Social Committee) 
opinion, as civil society should be more involved in building momentum against money laundering 
and tax avoidance; 
7. Expand use, upgrade data quality, increase access and enhance transparency of public registries of 
corporates, UBOs and LEIs; 
8. Ensure clear objectives and key results of regulation, set useful and realistic KPIs; 
9. Address overall AML architecture to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of operation; 
10. Accelerate policy to implementation process to keep abreast of technological and criminal 
advancements; 
At the supervisory level: 
1. Upgrade the role of EBA with over time a separate governance structure for AML; 
2. Integrate FIUs toward the creation of a centralized intelligence unit. An EU intelligence unit would 
also be an effective way to aggregate data across the EU, connecting the dots, which individual 
banks are not in a position to do; 
3. The EU needs a single voice in international fora. Today, its international representation lacks 
streamlining. Fourteen EU countries are members of the FATF, while the other thirteen are 
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members of Moneyval. This causes fragmentation and generates artificial boundaries in the fight 
against money laundering and financial crime in general; 
4. More transparency (at the aggregate level) is needed for performance indicators used in AML: 
create a robust and uniform, EU-wide framework for relevant statistics (STRs, SARs, FIU 
investigations, prosecutions); 
5. Improve public private partnerships, feedback loops and media liaison; 
6. Improve training effectiveness for those involved in the law enforcement, judicial process, and data 
exchange; 
7. Provide effective inalienable budgets for law enforcement and judiciary capability and concomitant 
necessary support such as sufficient IT and staff; 
8. Shy away from micro management and enable obliged entities to develop effective AML risk 
management models; 
9. Assess boundaries with the economy and ensure fair access to financial markets, safe, fast and 
appropriate data exchange, proper competition, and reduce financial exclusion; 
10. Ensure both public and private sectors produce annual reports on progress. 
At the public policy level: 
1. Support informative campaigns and seminars to discuss more thoroughly the positive effects of 
strong AML practice in both the private and public sectors. 
Between the public and private sector: 
1. Public/private partnerships offer the potential to improve AML monitoring, but further work is 
required. While there are examples of good practice available, there needs to be guidance or a 
framework for establishing such partnerships and getting the most out of them. 
It is unrealistic to expect all the recommendations in this report to be carried out at the same time, even 
though all would result in improving the effectiveness of AML. There should thus be prioritisation. 
Recommendations that act as ‘kingpins’ (that solve more than one issue at the same time or have a 
greater impact) should be implemented first. Annex I of the Europol Regulation lists the forms of crime 
that fall under its mandate. Many of these are similar, and some rationalisation could be helpful, as well 
as sorting out which need combating most immediately. The Task Force would also urge that the 
recommendations be carried out concurrently rather than consecutively. There is no reason why a 
workstream looking at technological developments cannot operate at the same time as one looking at 
regulatory impact analysis, development of OKRs and KPIs, or improved training and the furnishing of 
more resources for law enforcement. 
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Table 5. Supranational risk assessment of money laundering threats and vulnerabilities by product/activity 
Product/Activity Money laundering threat Money laundering vulnerability 
Cash couriers Very significant (4) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Cash-intensive business Very significant (4) Very significant (4) 
High-value banknotes Very significant (4) Very significant (4) 
Payments in cash Very significant (4) Very significant (4) 
Privately owned ATMs Very significant (4) Significant (3) 
Deposits on accounts Very significant (4) Significant (3) 
Institutional investment sector — 
Banking Very significant (4) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Institutional investment sector — 
Brokers Very significant (4) Significant (3) 
Corporate banking sector Very significant (4) Significant (3) 
Private banking sector Very significant (4) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Crowd-funding Very significant (4) Significant (3) 
Currency exchange Very significant (4) Moderately significant (2) 
Transfers of funds Significant/very significant (3/4) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Illegal transfers of funds — Hawala Significant/very significant (3/4) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Payment services Significant/very significant (3/4) Significant (3) 
Virtual currencies and other virtual 
assets Significant/very significant (3/4) Very significant (4) 
Business loans Significant (3) Very significant (4) 
Consumer credit and low-value loans Significant (3) Moderately significant/significant (2/3) 
Mortgage credit and high-value asset-
backed credits Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Life insurance Significant (3) Moderately significant/significant (2/3) 
Non-life insurance Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Safe custody services Significant (3) Moderately significant/significant (2/3) 
Creation of legal entities and legal 
arrangements  Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Business activity of legal entities and 
legal arrangements Significant (3) Significant/very significant (3/4) 
Termination of business activity of legal 
entities and legal arrangements Significant (3) 
Moderately significant/significant 
(2/3) 
High-value goods – Artefacts and 
antiquities Significant (3) Very significant (4) 
High-value assets – Precious metals and 
precious stones Significant (3) Very significant (4) 
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High-value assets – Other than precious 
metals and stones Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Couriers in precious metals and stones Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Investment real estate Significant (3) Significant (3) 
Services provided by accountants, 
auditors, tax advisors Significant (3) Very significant (4) 
Legal services from notaries and other 
independent legal professionals 
Moderately 
significant/significant (2/3) Moderately significant (2) 
Betting Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Bingo Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Casinos Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Gaming machines (outside casinos) Moderately significant (2) Significant (3) 
Lotteries Moderately significant (2) Low/moderate significance (1-2) 
Poker Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Online gambling  Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Collection and transfers of funds 
through a non-profit organisation  Moderately significant (2) Moderately significant (2) 
Collection and transfers of funds 
through a non-profit organisation 
receiving institutional funding Low/moderate significance (1-2) Moderately significant (2) 
Investments in professional football and 
transfer agreements relating 
to professional football players Low significance (1) Low significance (1) 
Free ports Low significance (1) Low significance (1) 
Citizenship investment programmes and 
investor residence schemes Low significance (1) Low significance (1) 
E-money sector Unknown No assessment for illegal activities 
Source: EU Commission report (2019). 
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Table 6. Financial Supervisory Authorities for AML and FIUs in the member states (EU and EEA) 
Country  Name of the Authority Abbreviations* Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Department of FIUs 
Austria Finanzmarktaufsicht (FMA) FSA Bundeskriminalamt Ministry of Interior 
Belgium National Bank of Belgium (NBB) CB Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit Ministry of Justice and 
Ministry of Finance 
Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)  FSA    
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank (Българска народна банка) CB State Agency for National Security FID SANS State Agency for National 
Security 
Financial Supervision Commission (Комисия за финансов 
надзор) 
FSA   
 FID SANS (FIU) FIU   
Cyprus Insurance Companies Control Service (ICCS) SI Unit for Combating Money Laundering 
(MOKAS) 
Ministry of Justice  
(Attorney General) 
Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission FCMC   
Central Bank of Cyprus (Κεντρική Τράπεζα της Κύπρου)  CB   
Czech 
Republic 
Czech National Bank (Česká Národní Banka) CB Financial Analytical Unit (FAU-CR) Ministry of Finance 
Financial Analytical Office of the Czech Republic FSA   
Germany Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, BaFin 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) 
FSA Zentralstelle für 
Finanztransaktionsuntersuchungen 
Customs authority 
Denmark Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet) FSA State Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime 
/ Money Laundering Secretariat 
Ministry of Justice 
Estonia Financial Supervision Authority (Finantsinspektsioon) FSA Money Laundering Information Bureau Customs administration 
Spain SEPBLAC, in cooperation with Banco de España, CNMV 
and DGSFP 
 Executive Service of the Commission for the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Monetary Infractions 
Bank of Spain 
Finland FIN-FSA (Financial Supervisory Authority) FSA National Bureau of Investigation Financial 
Intelligence Unit (RAP) 
Independent entity 
cooperation with Bank of 
Finland 
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France Financial Markets’ Authority  (Autorité des marchés 
financiers) 
FCMC Unit for Processing Intelligence and Action 
against Illicit Financial Networks (TRACFIN) 
Ministry of the Economy, 
Finance and Economic 
Recovery 
Prudential Supervisory and Resolution Authority 
(Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution)  
CB   
Greece Hellenic Capital Market Commission (Επιτροπή 
Κεφαλαιαγοράς) 
FCMC Hellenic Anti–Money Laundering and Anti-
Terrorism Financing Commission (HAMLC) 
Several ministries: see link 
 
Bank of Greece (Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος)  CB   
Croatia Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency 
(Hrvatska Agencija za Nadzor Financijskih Usluga) 
FSA Anti–Money Laundering Office Ministry of Finance 
Croatian National Bank (Hrvatska Narodna Banka)  CB   
Ministry of Finance, Financial Inspectorate MoF   
Hungary Central Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank)  CB Central Criminal Investigations Bureau of the 
Customs and Finance Guard 
National Tax and Customs 
Administration 
Iceland Financial Supervisory Authority (Fjármálaeftirlitid) FSA The District Prosecutor Ministry of Justice 
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland CB Bureau of Fraud Investigation (MLIU) Ministry of Justice 
Italy Bank of Italy (Banca d'Italia) CB Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) Bank of Italy 
"IVASS" - Institute for Insurance Supervision SI   
OAM (Organismo degli Agenti e dei Mediatori) 
 
  
Latvia Consumer Rights Protection Centre of Latvia 
 
Control Service - Office for Prevention of 
Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal 
Activity 
Ministry of Finance 
Bank of Latvia (Latvijas Banka) CB   
Financial and Capital Market Commission  
(Finanšu un Κapitāla Τirgus Κomisija)  
FCMC   
Lithuania Financial Market Authority (Finanzmarktaufsicht) FSA Financial Crime Investigation Service Under the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of 
Lithuania (FCIS) 
Ministry of Interior 
 Bank of Lithuania (Lietuvos Bankas)  CB   
Luxembourg Commission for the Supervision of Financial Sector 
(Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier) 
FCMC Financial intelligence Unit (FIU – LUX) Ministry of Justice 
Commissariat aux Assurances (CAA) SI   
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Malta Malta Financial Services Authority FSA Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU) Ministry of Finance 
Netherlands The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) FCMC Financial Intelligence Unit — Nederland Independent government body 
Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) CB   
Norway Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet) FSA  Økokrim 
Poland FIU Poland  
(Generalny Inspektor Informacji Finansowej) 
FIU FIU Poland 
(Generalny Inspektor Informacji Finansowej) 
Ministry of Finance 
FSA Poland (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego) FSA   
Portugal Bank of Portugal (Banco de Portugal)  CB Financial Information Unit (UIF) Ministry of Finance 
ASF (Autoridade de Supervisão de Seguros e Fundos de 
Pensões)  
FSA   
CMVM - Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários  FCMC   
Romania Financial Supervisory Authority (Autoritatea de 
Supraveghere Financiara) 
FSA National Office for the Prevention and Control of 
Money Laundering (ONPCSB) 
Ministry of Justice 
National Bank of Romania (Banca Naţională a 
României) 
CB   




Slovakia National Bank of Slovakia (Národná Banka Slovenska) CB Financial Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of 
Organised Crime (SJFP UBPOK) 
Ministry of Interior 
FIU (Finančná spravodajská jednotka) FIU   
Slovenia Securities Market Agency FCMC Office for Money Laundering Prevention (OMLP) Ministry of Finance 
Bank of Slovenia (Banka Slovenije)  CB   
Insurance Supervision Agency (AZN)  SI   
Office for Money Laundering Prevention FIU   
Sweden Finansinspektionen (Sweden) FSA National Criminal Intelligence Service, Financial 
Unit (NFIS) 
National Police Force 
UK Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) CB National Crime Agency (NCA) Home Office 
 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) FSA   
*FSA = Financial Supervisory Authority;   CB = Central Bank;   FIU = Financial Intelligence Unit; MoF - Ministry of Finance;   
FCMC = Financial Capital Market Commission;  SI = Superintendent of Insurance      
Source: updated from EBA and FIU.net  
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Table 7. EU FIUs websites, annual reports and number of SARs 
Country FIU Website Annual 
report 
SARs latest 
Austria Austrian FIU (A-FIU) None None No data 
Belgium Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit Cel voor Financiële 
Informatieverwerking - Cellule de Traitement de Informations Financieres 
www.ctif-cfi.be 2019 25,991 
Bulgaria FID-SANS Financial Intelligence Directorate State Agency for National Security www.dans.bg 2019 2,894 












FAU-CR Financial Analytical Unit Financní analytický útvar https://www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/zpra
vy-o-cinnosti.html  
2019 3,954 
Denmark HVIDVASK - Hvidvasksekretariatet Stadsadvokaten for Særlig Økonomisk 
Kriminalitet 
https://hvidvask.politi.dk/Home  NRA 2018 24,911 
(2017) 
Estonia Rahapesu Andmeburoo https://www.politsei.ee/en/financial-
intelligence-unit 
2019 6,164 
Finland RAP Keskusrikospoliisi-Rahanpesun selvittelykeskus https://www.poliisi.fi/crimes/financial_intell
igence_unit  
None No data 
France TRACFIN - Traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits 
financiers clandestins 
www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin  
Only available in French 
2019 99,527 
Germany Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) www.fiu.bund.de 2019 114,914 
Greece HAMLC - Hellenic Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing 
Commission 
www.hellenic-fiu.gr 2018 6,450 
Hungary Central Criminal Investigations Bureau of the Hungarian Customs and 
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Ireland MLIU - An Garda Síochána, Garda National Economic Crime Bureau www.garda.ie 2018 23,939 
Italy UIF - Banca d’Italia - Unità di Informazione Finanziaria http://www.bancaditalia.it/chi-
siamo/organizzazione/uif/index.html 
2020 105,789 
Latvia Kontroles dienests - Noziedîgi iegûto lîdzeklu legalizâcijas novçrsanas 
dienests 




FCIS - Finansiniu Nusikaltimu Tyrimo Tarnyba Prie Lietuvos Respublikos 
Vidaus Reikalu Ministerijos Pinigu Plovimo Prevencijos Skyrius 
www.fntt.lt/en  2020 1,501 
Luxembourg Cellule de Renseignement Financier www.crf.lu  
Only available in French 
2020 52,374 
Malta FIAU - Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit www.fiumalta.org 2019 2,778 
Netherlands FIU - Netherlands http://en.fiu-nederland.nl/ 2019 39,544 
Poland Generalyny Inspektor Informacji Finansowej https://www.gov.pl/web/finance/aml-cft  None No data 
Portugal UIF - Unidade de Informação Financeira None None No data 




SJFP UBPOK - Spravodajská jednotka financnej polície Úradu boja proti 
organizovanej kriminalite 
www.minv.sk  None No data 
Slovenia OMLP - Urad RS za Preprecevanje Pranja Denarja Ministrstvo za Finance None None No data 
Spain SEPBLAC - Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención de Blanqueo 
de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias Banco de Espana 
www.sepblac.es 2019 7,354 
Sweden FIU - Sweden FIPO Finanspolisen Rikskriminalpolisen None None No data 
United 
Kingdom 
NCA - National Crime Agency www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk 2020 573,085 
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